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Rethinking the Law Firm Organizational
Form and Capitalization Structure
Edward S. Adams
1. INTRODUCTION
The recent bankruptcy of large law firms has energized the debate over
the viability of the traditional partnership model. Dewey & LeBeouf filed for
bankruptcy in May 2012, becoming the largest law firm bankruptcy in U.S.
history.' At its peak, Dewey employed 1,400 lawyers in several offices
across the globe, causing some to ask whether Dewey's collapse was an iso-
lated product of poor management or a symptom of greater systemic prob-
2lems. But Dewey's bankruptcy was not the first to result in the dissolution
of a large firm. The financial downturn of 2008 deeply affected the legal
profession, and several firms went under.
Many have already questioned the traditional business structure of the
law firm in light of these bankruptcies and the manner in which they oc-
curred.4 Partner defections and limited capital place criticism squarely on the
partnership model as a major factor in these bankruptcies. Movements in
Australia and the United Kingdom to liberalize law firm business structures
and allow for both outside equity and multidisciplinary practices (MDPs)
further fuel the criticism here in the United States. The American Bar Asso-
ciation (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) have long
prohibited public ownership and MDPs in law firms over concerns that such
arrangements would encourage violations of the professional rules.7
* I am grateful to Christopher Bentley, James Kiner, Ralph Foote, Lauren
Bergstrom, Jen Rutz, Janelle McCarty, and Kelsey Knutson for their exemplary re-
search assistance and challenging and invaluable comments.
1. Peter Lattman, Dewey & LeBoeuf Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (May 28, 2012, 10:21 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/
28/dewey-leboeuf-files-for-bankruptcy/.
2. Id.
3. Examples include two San Francisco firms, Thelen and Heller Ehrman, and
Howrey out of Washington. Id.
4. Michael Bobelian, Dewey's Downfall Exposes the Demise of Partnerships,
FORBES (June 7, 2012, 10:49 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelbobelian/
2012/06/07/deweys-downfall-exposes-the-demise-of-partnerships/; Report: New York
State Bar Association: Report of the Task Force on Nonlawyer Ownership, 76 ALB. L.
REV. 865, 947 (2012-2013).
5. See Lattman, supra note 1.
6. See infra Part IV.A.
7. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2012); Paul D. Paton, Multi-
disciplinary Practice Redux: Globalization, Core Values, and Reviving the MDP
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The goal of this Article is to examine the partnership model and advo-
cate for a change in the Model Rules that would allow for public ownership
of law firms, and to make disclosure of firm financials a mandatory require-
ment for all firms with over 100 lawyers. Part II explores the history and
evolution of limited liability and law firm structures in the United States. Part
III discusses incorporated law firms and MDPs and how they might benefit
U.S. law firms. Part IV looks at the developments in the United Kingdom
and Australia and the forces of globalization that have an effect on U.S. poli-
cy choices, concluding that global competition for legal services may force
our hand. Part V advocates for similar changes in the U.S. public ownership
because allowing public ownership in law firms will benefit both law firms
and their clients and make firms more competitive globally. This Part con-
cludes by advocating for mandatory disclosure requirements to benefit firms,
prospective attorneys, and their clients.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF LIMITED LIABILITY AND LAW FIRM
STRUCTURES
The formation and governance of business entities is regulated by state
8law. Each state has a history of corporate and partnership regulation, and
in recent decades new hybrid forms of business entities have evolved to fill
the needs that corporate and partnership laws alone do not adequately
address. 9 Law firms have been adopting the new business models made
available by state statutes.' 0 Most notably, law firms have begun taking
Debate in America, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2193, 2193-94 (2010); John Eligon, Selling
Pieces of Law Firms to Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2011, at Bl, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/29/business/selling-pieces-of-law-firms-to-
investors.html?pagewanted=all; Sara Randazzo, ABA Panel Says No to Outside Law
Firm Ownership, AM. LAW. DAILY (Dec. 5, 2011, 7:05 PM), available at LexisNexis.
8. See J.W. Verret, Terrorism Finance, Business Associations, and the "Incor-
poration Transparency Act, " 70 LA. L. REV. 857, 857 (2010) ("The process by which
these entities are created has traditionally been governed under state law.").
9. See Robert A. Kessler, With Limited Liability For All: Why Not a Partner-
ship Corporation?, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 235, 252 (1967); Christel Walther, LLC and
Lawyers: A Good Combination?, 50 Loy. L. REV. 359, 406 (2004); see also J. Wil-
liam Callison & Allan W. Vestal, "They've Created a Lamb With Mandibles of
Death": Secrecy, Disclosure, and Fiduciary Duties in Limited Liability Firms, 76
IND. L.J. 271, 271-74 (2001) (discussing popular acceptance of reform efforts for
business organizations); Thomas E. Rutledge, The Alphabet Soup of Unincorporated
Business Law: What is Happening with LLCs, LPs, LLPs, GPs, LLLPs, & BTs and
Dealing with RUPA, RERULPA, (RE)ULLCA, UNETA, MITA, & META, VMLO202
ALI-ABA 1 (Feb. 2006) (exploring the various disparate forms of modern business
organization within the legal context).
10. See Callison & Vestal, supra note 9, at 273-74.
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advantage of limited liability." While the evolution to limited liability within
law firms has been a huge transformation, states have not yet enabled law
firms to utilize other business forms that would allow them to have both lim-
ited liability and the ability to manage capital accounts and cash flow in a
way that would leave firms less vulnerable to the exit of a partner or broader
outside economic influences.
A. The Evolution of State Partnership Laws and Their Effect on
Law Firm Structures
General Partnership (GP) law was originally codified in 191412 and be-
came the standard business form used by law firms.13 The most attractive
characteristic of the GP is the pass-through taxation of firm income, in which
partnership profits are not subject to an entity-level tax but rather are taxed as
personal income only when the partners receive a profit distribution.' 4 More
and more firms, however, have foregone the traditional GP form to instead
partake in attractive limited liability entities such as limited liability compa-
nies (LLC) and limited liability partnerships (LLP).15 Whereas in a GP each
partner is exposed to "unlimited[] personal[] liab[ility] for both the miscon-
duct of his or her partners, as well as any debts of the partnership to the extent
that either exceed the assets of the partnership,"' 6 in the LLC or LLP entities
the respective member or partner (collectively "member") can at a minimum
limit their personal liability to their own torts and thus remove any personal
liability for the torts of other members.' 7
11. See Carol R. Goforth, Limiting the Liability of General Partners in LLPs: An
Analysis of Statutory Alternatives, 75 OR. L. REV. 1139, 1140-43 (1996) [hereinafter
Goforth, Limiting the Liability] (stating that the introduction of limited liability to
professional service providers, such as law firms, relieves partners from the burden of
unlimited personal liability under the general partnership model). Partners previously
had been personally liable "for any loss or injury arising out of 'any wrongful act or
omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course of partnership business or with
the authority of the co-partners."' Id. at 1222 n.1 (quoting Unif. P'ship Act § 13
(1994), 6 U.L.A. 444 (1995)).
12. See id. at 1158.
13. See Martin C. McWilliams, Jr., Limited Liability Law Practice, 49 S.C. L.
REV. 359, 361 (1998).
14. See 26 U.S.C. § 701 (2011).
15. See Joseph S. Naylor, Is the Limited Liability Partnership Now the Entity of
Choice for Delaware Law Firms?, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 145, 148-56 (1999) (arguing
that the Professional Corporation model is an outdated method of providing limited
liability and associating the 1981 legislation on tax that provided partnerships with the
same tax incentives as those available to corporations).
16. Id. at 147-48.
17. See id. at 152-53.
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The LLC entity was first introduced in Wyoming in 1977.18 Florida was
the only other state to enact an LLC statute until the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) explicitly acknowledged that LLCs would be recognized as partner-
ships.19  After the IRS made this acknowledgement, many states quickly
jumped on the limited liability bandwagon hoping to lure new business into
the state to take advantage of corporate tax revenues, as well as investment
20 21
capital. 2 By 1995, all but three states had enacted LLC statutes. One of the
primary disadvantages of LLCs is that the formation of an LLC, depending
on the state, essentially requires the creation of a new business entity.22 LLCs
are at a disadvantage because this business form has not been fully tested in
courts, meaning that potential complications that could arise under securities
and tax laws have not been fully explored. 23
Although they are more recent additions in the land of hybrid business
forms, LLPs have quickly grown in popularity, becoming more attractive to
law firms than the LLC form.24 LLPs first emerged as a new business form in
Texas in 1991 and initially limited a partner's vicarious liability only to mal-
practice claims resulting from actions (or omissions) of other partners.25 The
18. See Susan Saab Fortney, Seeking Shelter in the Minefield of Unintended
Consequences - the Traps of Limited Liability Law Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
717, 722 (1997) [hereinafter Fortney, Seeking Shelter] (noting that the new legislation
was proposed and enacted for the purpose of allowing business entities to offer lim-
ited liability to all equity participants while avoiding double taxation).
19. See Carol R. Goforth, The Rise of the Limited Liability Company: Evidence
of a Race Between the States, but Heading Where? 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1193, 1222
n. 134 (1995) [hereinafter Goforth, The Rise of the Limited Liability Company] (stating
that Rev. Rul. 88-76 was announced following years of confusion about how LLCs
would be treated by the IRS).
20. See Fortney, Seeking Shelter, supra note 18, at 722-24 (explaining that attor-
neys and accountants viewed the LLC form as the "best of both worlds" and assisted
business groups in lobbying to their respective state legislatures, having the result that
many states implicitly welcomed professionals to practice as LLCs by statutory grant
that LLCs may be created for "any lawful purpose").
21. See Goforth, The Rise of the Limited Liability Company, supra note 19,
at 1250 ("As of the start of 1995, only Hawaii, Vermont and Massachusetts lacked
LLC legislation, and bills regarding the new form of entity were pending in all
three states.").
22. See Naylor, supra note 15, at 151.
23. See Goforth, Limiting the Liability, supra note 11, at 1152 (stating the lack of
clarity as to which corporate and partnership doctrines will apply to LLCs and how
the law will treat LLCs in general).
24. A 1995 survey of Texas law firms shows that the LLP form had been adopt-
ed by a majority of large firms. See Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners
Islands unto Themselves? An Empirical Study of Law Firm Peer Review and Culture,
10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 280 (1997).
25. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.801 (West 2011) (originally TEX. REV
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 15 (West Supp. 1992)); see Fortney, Seeking Shelter,
supra note 18, at 724 (noting that while Texas led the way for LLP formation, it was
[Vol. 78780
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LLP structure appeals to professional partnerships, such as law firms, for a
variety of reasons: (1) the firms can continue to function as they did before
with the added benefit of limited liability as to both tort and contract claims;
(2) unlike LLCs, the LLP form does not require partnerships to create an en-
tirely new type of business entity; and (3) the LLP form allows for the con-
tinued tradition of professionals holding themselves out as "partners" (rather
than as "members").26 Within a year of the emergence of the LLP structure,
the IRS issued an important ruling confirming that LLPs would continue to be
taxed as partnerships, allowing the continued use of pass-through taxation. 27
Within six years, LLP legislation exploded across the United States and many
states expanded limited liability to "full shield" protection, providing for lim-
ited personal liability for both tort and contract claims.28 This type of full
shield protection is necessary in large firms where not every partner can en-
sure the accountability of everyone else.29 This race among states to attract
more revenue was to the benefit of business and professional firms, not nec-
essarily the clients whose ability to pursue individual partners or lawyers for
malpractice or malfeasance was thereby diminished.30
LLP formation is simple. Most states have a filing requirement to put
the public and the state on notice that the firm desires to conduct business
not without criticisms of the new form, with labels such as "help-a-lawyer-bill" and
concerns about the lack of a limited liability signal to third parties).
After partnership expert Professor Alan R. Bromberg criticized the bill, legis-
lators asked him to propose amendments. Professor Bromberg's revisions addressed
objections to the bill by:
(1) Extending the liability limitation to all partnerships,
(2) Denying protection to partners for misconduct of those working under
their supervision or direction,
(3) Requiring annual registration with the state and inclusion of "L.L.P." or
"registered limited liability partnership," in the firm name, and
(4) Requiring liability insurance in an arbitrary and admittedly often inade-
quate amount of $100,000.
See id. at 725 (footnotes omitted).
26. Fortney, Seeking Shelter, supra note 18, at 725-26; see Naylor, supra note
15, at 155.
27. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-29-016 (July 17, 1992) ("[The] L.L.P. will be classi-
fled as a partnership for federal tax purposes.").
28. See, e.g., Bus. ORGS. § 152.801(a) ("[A] partner is not personally liable to
any person, including a partner, directly or indirectly, by contribution, indemnity, or
otherwise, for any obligation of the partnership incurred while the partnership is a
limited liability partnership."). Subsection (a) does not, however, affect "the liability
of a partner, if any, imposed by law or contract independently of the partner's status as
a partner." Id. § 152.801(d)(2).
29. See Goforth, Limiting the Liability, supra note 11, at 1159; see also Milton
C. Regan, Jr., Lawyers, Symbols, and Money: Outside Investment in Law Firms, 27
PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 407, 423 (2008).
30. See Goforth, The Rise of the Limited Liability Company, supra note 19,
at 1288.
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under the shield of limited liability. 3 1 The extent of protection from liabilities
varies greatly between jurisdictions.32 In general, an LLP partner has partial-
ly limited liability for the negligence, wrongful acts, and other misconduct of
other partners. In an increasing number of jurisdictions, partners have no
personal liability for any partnership debt (unless sophisticated creditors con-
tract around it, of course).34
Since LLPs are an extension of GPs, they are still based upon the classic
structure wherein the partners are co-owners of the firm, sharing in the firm's
profits, losses and risks.35  Additionally, LLP partners may participate
36in management while maintaining their limited-liability shield. LLPs are
also financed through capital contributions from the partners, just like in
the traditional GP.37 These contributions are put into capital accounts and
historically have made up a large percentage of a firm's assets.38 Despite the
fact that individual partners' liability is limited, the LLP is still fully liable for
any claims against the entity; as a result, all the partnership assets - such
31. See Goforth, Limiting the Liability, supra note 11, at 1145.
32. Id. at 1147.
33. Id. at 1148. Some states impose liability on partners if the wrongdoer was
under the partner's direct supervision and control. James D. Cox & Thomas L. Ha-
zen, 1 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 1:7 (3d ed. 2010).
34. Cox & Hazen, supra note 33, at § 1:7 ("The most recent version of the Re-
vised Uniform Partnership Act . . . provide[s] for the same type of limited liability
that exists with corporations-the partners are not liable for either the tort or contract
obligations of the partnership or of the other partners. Since a full liability shield can
be achieved through a limited liability company, it makes little if any sense to deny
this option to limited liability partnerships. It follows that an increasing number of
states have adopted the full liability shield for limited liability partnerships.").
35. See Unif. P'ship Act § 6(1) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 256 (1995); Unif. P'ship Act §
101(6) (1997), 6 U.L.A. 27 (Supp. 1998).
36. Kristin Balding Gutting, Keeping Pace with the Times: Exploring the Mean-
ing of Limited Partner for Purposes of the Internal Revenue Code, 60 U. KAN. L.
REv. 89, 116 (2011).
37. See Kelly L. Jones, Law Firms as Limited Liability Partnerships: Determin-
ing the Scope of the Liability Shield: A Shield of Steel or Silk?, 7 DuQ. Bus. L.J. 21,
29 (2005) (noting that although generally capital contribution is in the form of direct
financial infusion from the partners, more often firms are leveraging debt obtained
from banks); Erin J. Cox, An Economic Crisis Is a Terrible Thing to Waste: Reform-
ing the Business of Law for a Sustainable and Competitive Future, 57 UCLA L. REv.
511, 518 (2009) ("Law firms became increasingly dependent on bank financing for
working capital."); c.f Tina Williams, Partnerships: Prudent Lenders, LEGAL WEEK
(Aug. 4, 2009, 9:28 AM), http://www.legalweek.com/legal-week/analysis/1496256/
partnerships-prudent-lenders (noting that firms' reliance on bank financing contribut-
ed to lax management of finances, including debt collection from clients).
38. See Jones, supra note 37, at 29.
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as the funds within the capital account - remain at risk in connection with
any such liability. 39
B. Law Firm Capital Accounts and the Struggle for
Viability Through a Partnership
Law firm capital accounts hold the firm's working capital. 40 An increas-
ing number of firms have attempted to maximize earnings per partner (the
frequently-used metric for law firm profitability) by limiting the number of
equity partners in the firm.41 This has created a two-tiered system of "part-
ner" titles in the firm: the first-tier "rainmakers," who are the highly-coveted
equity partners who bring in and maintain clients,42 and the second-tier non-
equity partners. If, or when, the rainmakers leave, they can take their clients
with them, and - even more perilous to the company - withdraw their capital
contributions.4 3 Such an exodus of capital and the partner's associated cash
flow, as well as the related problem of the firm sometimes replacing that
missing capital by excessive leveraging, has resulted in an astounding number
of law firms collapsing."
39. Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?: A
Proposal for Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 28 (1998).
40. See, e.g., Unif. P'ship Act §18 (1914), Unif. P'ship Act § 401(a) (1997) (re-
maining the same in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act).
41. See Cox, supra note 37, at 519 ("Many firms have established a second class
of nonequity partners who are paid a salary instead of sharing in the firm's profits in
order to increase the appearance of high profitability.").
42. See id. It is imperative to keep these partners happy and to distribute a satis-
factory amount of profits, sometimes leaving little left in reserve for the firm. Id. The
ever-imminent threat is ABA Model Rule 5.6 (prohibiting enforcement of noncom-
pete agreements of lawyers), making it so these partners can leave whenever they
want, and bring their clientele with them. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
5.6(a) (2012).
43. The most common triggering events of law firm collapse include: (1) rapid
overexpansion; (2) unexpected loss of significant partners to other firms; (3) break-
down in merger process of financially-distressed firm; or (4) impending expiration or
renewal of law firm office lease. Hildebrandt International, The Anatomy of Law
Firm Failures, J. LAW Soc. SCOT. (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.joumalonline.
co.uk/Magazine/53-12/1005996.aspx#.Ubf8XJxrp2F.
44. See Cox, supra note 37, at 522 (discussing the Hildebrant International
study on the causes behind the recent law firm collapses, noting that financial
health was a primary factor); see also Melissa Hogan, Skinny Dipping: The Anatomy
ofLaw Firm Demise, ED WESEMANN (Jan. 28, 2010), http://edwesemann.com/articles/
general/2010/01/28/skinny-dipping-the-anatomy-of-law-firm-demise/ (putting signifi-
cant emphasis on partner defections, the effect that has on finances of the firm,
and the lack of a contingency plan to circumvent major structural issues in the event
of such defection).
2013] 783
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C. LLP Statutes Have Provided Law Firms with the Most Beneficial
Structure Yet, but Are Not Without Limitations and Problems
Three main issues limit the attractiveness of LLPs: (1) the uncertainty of
vicarious liability,45 (2) the lack of incentive for firms to invest in their asso-
ciates for fear that they will gain knowledge and then leave for a "better"
job,46 and (3) the ethics mandate preventing non-lawyer ownership.47
Over the last forty years, firms have created a myriad of hybrid struc-
tures in an effort to balance the encouragement of innovation and entrepre-
neurship with the realities of business owners' liabilities to co-owners, em-
ployees, and third parties. Law firms have changed with time, adapting to the
most efficient business form currently available: the LLP. Yet this form, like
the forms that came before it, is not necessarily the right choice for every
firm. The LLP structure is still difficult for firms to utilize because of signifi-
48
cant differences in laws between states, wariness of court treatment of LLPs
in litigation,49 and the ever-present mandate against non-lawyer investment.50
45. See Robert W. Hillman, The Impact of Partnership Law on the Legal Profes-
sion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 407-08 (1998) ("[A] form of limited vicarious liabil-
ity survives even in LLPs because assets of the partnership are available to satisfy
claims against individual partners. When these assets are reached, the non-liable
partners effectively have nonrecourse liability for even 'fully shielded' obligations.").
46. See id. at 409 ("Interestingly, the sudden emergence of limited liability for
lawyers has occurred during a time when other, unrelated forces also are working to
reduce incentives for firms to monitor and train. The 'revolving door' feature of
many law firms, client loyalties running to the lawyer rather than the firm, clear in-
centives to hoard rather than to share clients, allocations of income based on individu-
al rather than group productivity, the proliferation of satellite offices, and relentless
pressures to reduce the costs of providing legal services are among the factors under-
mining firm investment in establishing and maintaining monitoring and mentoring
mechanisms. As these trends merge with the narrowing of civil liability vicariously
imposed, it is possible that firms will commit fewer resources to monitoring and men-
toring activities.").
47. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2012).
48. "First Generation" statutes protect partners from malpractice claims resulting
from a partner's negligence or malfeasance while leaving LLP partners jointly (or
jointly and severally) liable for other partnership liabilities, debts and obligations. J.
WILLIAM CALLISON AND MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW & PRACTICE §
32:3 (2011). "Second Generation" statutes generally state that partners bear no per-
sonal liability for any partnership obligations or liabilities arising from the malprac-
tice of a co-partner or other person not under the partner's supervision or control. Id.
"Third Generation" statutes try to alleviate problems of the former version by provid-
ing that partners with "full protection" from vicarious liability. Id.
49. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 78784
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III. ENTERING THE ERA OF LAW FIRM, INC. AND
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICES
Currently, Model Rule 5.4 explicitly prohibits MDP arrangements, fee
sharing agreements among non-lawyers, law firm leadership by non-lawyers,
and law firm incorporation.5 ' This Rule seeks to protect the lawyer's "pro-
fessional independent judgment," 52 but it does so by putting a broad prohibi-
tion on the structure of law firms, rather than on the behavior or conduct of
lawyers.53 Despite this Rule, law firm structures have been creeping towards
incorporation; firms are increasingly functioning as businesses and no longer
fall under the "one size fits all" category that existed in the early 1900s.54 A
myriad of scholars and commentators argue that Rule 5.4 is outdated. 5 Many
states have contemplated changes, and some have even implemented such
changes, allowing law firms to take advantage of alternative business struc-
56tures - with limitations. Providing firms with the option to incorporate or
engage in MDPs as alternatives to the various partnership forms could enable
51. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2012); see Brian MacEwen et al.,
Law Firm, Ethics, and Equity Capital, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 61, 62-63 (2008).
52. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 cmt. 1 (2012).
53. MacEwen et al., supra note 51, at 63.
54. See Chandler N. Hodge, Law Firms in the U.S.: To Go Public or Not to Go
Public?, 34 U. DAYTON L. REV. 79, 79 (2008). Compare id. at 86-87 (labeling the
ABA's resistance as a "ABA's medieval guild mentality" which has created an
inefficient cartel in the practice of law and engaged in regulatory capture of the legal
industry which represents 2% of U.S. GDP), and MacEwen et al., supra note 51, at
62 ("Firms have grown substantially, with many containing more than one thousand
lawyers."), with Adams & Matheson, supra note 39, at 23 (noting that critics
believe that changing the law firm model will denigrate the legal profession, as the
firm will focus on ways to enhance shareholder value at the expense of the client's
best interest).
55. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 39, at I (stating that this prohibition on
investment in law firms has created an inefficient legal services market because firms
are unable to expand, compete, and spend funds on equipment and personnel).
56. See Justin D. Petzold, Firm Offers: Are Publicly Traded Law Firms Abroad
Indicative of the Future of the United States Legal Sector?, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 67, 91-
92 (2009) (noting that North Dakota allowed investment in law firms briefly, but the
law was quickly struck down by the state supreme court); Daniel Fisher, North Caro-
lina Bill Would Let Non-Lawyers Invest in Law Firms, FORBES (Mar. 11, 2011, 8:22
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2011/03/1I/north-carolina-bill-would-
let-non-lawyers-invest-in-law-firms/ (announcing that North Carolina has a bill right
now that would allow non-lawyer investment, up to 49% non-lawyer ownership); Lise
Bang-Jensen, New York State Bar Association Studies Law Firm Ownership by
Nonlawyers, N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.nysba.org/CustomTem-
plates/Content.aspx?id=26964 (stating that a New York State Bar Association task
force will study whether nonlawyers should be allowed to own equity in law firms).
2013] 785
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outside investors to infuse much needed capital into firms without jeopardiz-
ing ethical conduct.
A. Implications ofIncorporation and Compliance
with Ethical Requirements
The Model Rules provide an explicit prohibition on law firm incorpora-
tion.57 Model Rule 5.4(d) states that "a lawyer shall not practice with or in
the form of a professional corporation . .. if: (1) a nonlawyer owns any inter-
est therein . . . (2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer . . . or (3) a
nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a
lawyer. However, the adoption of this Rule in whole or in part is depend-
ent upon the choice of each state's bar association.5 9
The ABA strives to force a dichotomy between law firms and business-
es. It is unclear whether this dichotomy exists outside of the Model Rules.
Many legal academics question the continued existence of this split given its
distortion of reality and diminishing application to the functioning of many
law firms.6o As law firms adopt characteristics more akin to those of corpo-
rate structures than those of traditional law firm partnerships,61 a rule on law-
yer behavior rather than law firm structure might more effectively target the
intended protections of Rule 5.4.62
1. How Law Firms Would Function Within a Corporate Structure
The managerial structure of corporations and LLPs differ markedly, cre-
ating tension with the ABA and the potential for abuse of independent profes-
sional judgment. Using Delaware General Corporate Law (DGCL) statutes
as a guide,63 there is sufficient flexibility in the default rules to allow a law
57. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 39, at 4.
58. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2012).
59. See generally Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional, A.B.A. CTR.
FOR PROF. RESP., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professionalresponsibility/
committeescommissions/ethicsandprofessionalresponsibility.html (last visited Mar.
25, 2012) (explaining that the model rules are offered as a guide to states in creating
ethical standards). Model rules are, by their name, voluntary - they are a model set
forth by the private national association, which encourages each state's public bar
association to adopt similar rules. See Al Sturgeon, The Truth Shall Set You Free: A
Distinctively Christian Approach to Deception in the Negotiation Process, 11 PEPP.
DisP. RESOL. L.J. 395, 395 (2011).
60. See MacEwen et al., supra note 51, at 77, 86 (with one author proclaiming
that not only is the dichotomy wrong, but it is perpetuating the wrong model for
law firms).
61. See id. at 62 ("law firms more closely resemble their corporate clients").
62. See id. at 63.
63. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101 et seq. (West, Westlaw through 79 Laws 2013).
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firm to add provisions within the certificate of incorporation (certificate) and
bylaws that achieve the same purpose as Rule 5.4 in preserving independent
professional judgment.6
A board of directors centrally manages corporations. Critics of
law firm incorporation argue that, if firms were to adopt a similar manage-
ment structure, this would provide non-lawyers with control over the
direction of the firm.66 However, DGCL § 141(a) gives the board of directors
the exclusive authority to control the management of the corporation, and the
law firm's certificate could expressly limit shareholder power. 67 In addition,
a law firm's bylaws could allow shareholders to make recommendations
to the board. Because state corporate law provides for the board of directors
to make decisions on behalf of the corporation, shareholders would have
no direct influence over the professional judgment of any individual
lawyer-employee.
Further, director and officer positions could be expressly limited in the
certificate to be available only to lawyers within the firm. 9 While sharehold-
ers would be entitled to approve the board selection, the law firm would be
able to maintain control over corporate decisions. The board of directors
would function similar to the managing partners within the partnership struc-
ture. Essentially, shareholders would have very few rights of legal ownership
as are present in traditional shareholding, and investing in law firms would be
a practice in caveat emptor. Upon considering the structure of a law firm in
corporate form, profit maximization will likely be realized by putting clients'
64. The certificate of incorporation only requires the following: the name and
address of the corporation, the nature of and purpose of the business, information on
stock authorization, and the name and address of incorporators. Id. § 102. The by-
laws may contain any provision so long as it is consistent with the certificate. See id.
§ 109. This means that the bylaws can structure a law firm to put client confidentiali-
ty in front of the duty of loyalty with regards to absolute disclosure, making it fall
within the business judgment rule.
65. See id. § 141(a) (stating that business affairs of the corporation will be man-
aged by the board).
66. See MacEwen et al., supra note 51, at 87.
67. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (allowing the articles to include a
provision defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation, the direc-
tors, and the stockholders), Hodge, supra note 54, at 84 (noting that Slater & Gordon
in Australia successfully achieved this through including a provision in the prospectus
that specified that the firms priority of duty was to the courts, clients, and then to the
shareholders).
68. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a).
69. See id § 102(b)(1) (allowing the certificate of incorporation to include any
provision for the management of the business and/or the conduct of the affairs of the
corporation, and any provision creating, defining, limiting, and regulating the powers
of the corporation, the directors, and the stockholders).
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needs ahead of those of shareholders, as clients are the firm's profit centers.70
If the success of firms abroad is indicative of shareholder willingness to in-
vest,71 there are likely shareholders willing to invest in U.S. law firms.
Firms could take any form within the spectrum of closely-held corpora-
tions to large publicly-traded firms.7 2 If firms chose to be publicly traded,
they could still maintain control over the board by only issuing a minority of
shares to outside investors.73 This available spectrum would enable law firms
to adopt the business model that best suited its legal needs, allowing it to ex-
plore more cost-effective methods of providing legal services.74 Incorpora-
tion is a very broad concept preoccupied with achieving efficiency, 75 but the
corporate form could be tailored to suit the specific needs of a law firm and
its ethical requirements. In addition, proponents of incorporation argue that
the Model Rules - governing the actual conduct of lawyers - serve to ade-
quately protect clients in the corporate model.76
2. Incorporation Would Provide Law Firms with a
New Method of Generating Income
Firms have started to push back against the broad prohibition in Rule
5.4. Jacoby & Meyers Law Offices, LLP challenged the constitutionality of
Rule 5.4 of New York's Rules of Professional Conduct, which is virtually
identical to Model Rule 5.4, stating that the Rule is essentially unfounded and
serves only to prevent the firm from accessing capital to continue to help
70. See Jason Krause, Selling Law on an Open Market, A.B.A. J. (July 1, 2007,
5:52 PM CST), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/selling law on an
open market/ (noting that it is counter to the firms' interest to put anyone ahead of the
client as clients are the lifeblood of the firm).
71. See Petzold, supra note 56, at 68 (pointing to Slater and Gordon's profits
exceeding expectations in its first year as a publicly traded firm).
72. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 342(a) (defining closely-held corporations as not
exceeding thirty shareholders). The default rule on closely-held corporations is that
the firm is not closely held unless explicitly stated in the certificate with a heading.
See id. § 343.
73. See Hodge, supra note 54, at 94.
74. See Nathan Koppel, Jacoby & Meyers' Newest Fight: Helping Nonlawyers
Own Law Firms, WALL ST. J. (May 19, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SBl0001424052748703421204576331531008464712.html (noting the complaint
filed on May 18, 2011 states that "the small [legal] practice does not have access to
the capital markets that the Wall Street [law] firms have.").
75. See Gillian Hadfield & Eric Talley, On Public Versus Private Provision of
Corporate Law, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 414, 415 (2006), available at http://scholar-
ship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/496/.
76. See Hodge, supra note 54, at 80 (stating that proponents believe ABA rules
on issues of conflict of interest, fraud, and malpractice adequately govern the conduct
of lawyers).
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those most in need of legal services. 77 They further stated that the firm's
dedication to the highest level of independent professional judgment is not
predicated on the firm's source of capital, making Rule 5.4 an unnecessary
barrier to the law firm's growth and innovation.78
Many proponents of law firm incorporation have pointed to Model Rule
5.4 as stymieing innovation that could lead to more efficient structures.
Incorporation allows for outside investment to reach law firms, and this
investment is clearly desired as many firms lack flexibility in funds that
would otherwise allow them to innovate and invest capital in new recruits.80
Proponents of incorporation argue that passive investment in law firms could
actually encourage lawyer-employees to act in the best interest of the firm,
in response to critics who argue that incorporation will just financially benefit
the lawyers. 82  It remains unclear why opponents argue that passive
investment would change the level of financial risk assumed by law firms.83
Share prices may increase and decrease depending on the perceived value of
the firm, but the exit of a rainmaker will not leave the firm in a desperate state
of financial shock, as it does in the current partnership structure. A law
firm's assets are the mobile individuals it employs.84 In theory, firm value
would not depend only on the value of an individual rainmaker but also on
the efficient structure of the firm.85 The efficiency of a law firm could im-
prove with increased investment in technology, knowledge management sys-
tems, and new lawyer training.86 Although the corporate form also brings
with it the double-taxation system, the up-front investment received from
shareholders would arguably balance this out, enabling firms to take on risky
cases or contingency-fee cases with high pay-off potential (that they other-
wise could not afford).
77. See Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5, Jacoby
& Myers, LLP v. Presiding Justices of the 1st, 2d, 3d, & 4th Dep'ts, App. Div. of the
Supreme Court of N.Y., No. CV-1 1-3387 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2011), 2011 WL
7102185; Koppel, supra note 74.
78. See Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note
77, at T30.
79. See Hodge, supra note 54, at 92-93.
80. See id at 92.
81. See MacEwen et al., supra note 51, at 88.
82. See STEPHEN A. LIND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE TAXATION 133
(Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 7th ed. 2008).
83. See id. at 70 (raising the question in general).
84. See David M. Stem, Law Firm Bankruptcies, LITIGATION, J. ABA SEC.
LITIG., Spring 2011, at 9.
85. See id.
86. See MacEwen et al., supra note 51, at 84.
87. See Hodge, supra note 54, at 92.
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3. The Corporate Form Enhances Transparency Through Disclosure
Just as firms will have a wide spectrum of available options when
choosing a new business form, there is also a spectrum of disclosure
requirements. Partnerships are not required to disclose information about the
firm, but closely-held corporations and public corporations, as issuers of
securities, are subject to the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC)
scrutiny. Therefore, the corporate form enables greater transparency
through mandatory disclosure.
Clients, lawyer-employees, and society can all greatly benefit from dis-
closure. Some commentators currently argue that partnerships need to adopt
the corporate disclosure requirements regarding the corporate governance of
law firms. Employees would benefit from greater transparency within a law
firm, regardless of the firm's form, as it would allow them to have a better
understanding of the firm's policies prior to joining.90 Finally, society can
better hold law firms and legal professionals accountable if the business deci-
sions of a law firm are transparent, reviewable, and susceptible to public scru-
tiny.91 Thus, disclosure would enable clients to select law firms based on
reported earnings, charitable giving, and other factors beyond simply reputa-
tion that may influence a client's decision to use a firm.
The share price of a firm would also provide associates with insight into
whether or not to stay with the firm.92 The LLP structure only allows lawyers
to own a part of the firm when they "make partner," whereas upon incorpora-
tion a firm could quickly and easily align the interests of lawyer-employees
by issuing them shares of the corporation. 93 Transparency within a law firm
connects the lawyers, especially the new associates; even when the infor-
88. There is no provision in RUPA that requires any form of disclosure to part-
ners, customers, or other people involved in the organization. See generally Revised
Uniform Partnership Act (1997).
89. See Rachel B. Grand, Note, "It's Only Disclosure": A Modest Proposal for
Partnership Reform, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB POL'Y 389, 390 (2005).
90. See id. at 412. Grand argues for transparency to force firms to disclose hir-
ing criteria for new hires, id., but her idea could also serve new employees and em-
ployees currently within the firm.
91. See id. at 39 1.
92. See MacEwen et al., supra note 51, at 73-74; see also Grand, supra note 89,
at 407 (stating that the SEC Rule 33-8340's "new disclosure requirements are intend-
ed to make more transparent to security holders the operation of the boards of direc-
tors of the companies in which they invest.").
93. See MacEwen et al., supra note 51, at 88 (aligning interest through the use of
shares). This could also incentivize the associates to stay at the firm, increasing loyal-
ty and fiduciary duties.
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mation they receive is not necessarily positive, "transparency helps employ-
ees connect to the why." 94
Attaching a share price to corporate law firms and increasing financial
transparency for those outside the firm will also change the manner in which
firms are valued. 5 Public investors that would create the market for a law
firm's shares require detailed records of a company's costs and debt levels
that are currently unavailable for U.S. firms. And as the United States con-
fronts large-firm bankruptcies for the first time, real issues arise as to how to
properly value firms, with damaging consequences for former partners. 97
Increasing transparency through disclosure will sharpen valuation methods.
Both insiders and outsiders will have a greater sense of what a firm is worth,
potentially reflected in a share price.
The benefit of transparency must be balanced with the confidentiality
required in the attorney-client relationship.98 There is a risk that clients may
not feel as secure sharing sensitive information with a corporate lawyer-
employee.99 This concern may be exacerbated in the public corporate form.
Not only will law firms be governed by state corporate law and state rules on
professional conduct, but they will also be subject to SEC requirements. 0 0
The SEC requires disclosures in a Form S-3 registration statement,10 1 which
could infringe on attomey-client privilege and confidentiality.102 The Securi-
ties Act of 1933103 requires that companies preparing to offer securities to the
94. See Quint Studer, The Case for Transparency: 10 Reasons Your Firm Should
Keep No Secrets from Associates, 10-4 LAW OFF. MGMT. & ADMIN. REP. 1 (2010)
(stating that high performers want disclosure and certainty, not to be left in the dark).
95. Chris Johnson, Value Proposition; Nonlawyer Ownership of Firms in the
U.K. is Changing How Law Firms are Appraised, AM. LAW., May 1, 2012, at 23.
(discussing emerging methods of law firm appraisal in the U.K.).
96. See id.
97. See Stern, supra note 84, at 8-9 (discussing the unique complexities that arise
in law firm bankruptcies compared to industrial businesses). In particular, the bank-
ruptcy cases of Brobeck and Heller raised questions as to the liabilities of former
partners. Id. at 10. The bankruptcy trustees in Brobeck argued that for the last two
years of the firm's operation, it was insolvent and undercapitalized, and additionally
argued that much of the amounts paid to partners were actually dividends, leaving the
former partners potentially liable. Id. at 11. The Heller bankruptcy was also con-
fronted with the issue of whether and how to include revenue from former clients of
defunct law firms in the valuation of a law firm. Id. at 14.
98. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2012).
99. See MacEwen et al., supra note 51, at 71.
100. See Hodge, supra note 54, at 94-95.
101. SEC, Form S-3 Registration Statement, available at http://www.sec.gov/
about/forms/forms-3.pdf (last visited July 16, 2013).
102. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2012); Hodge, supra note 54,
at 93.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (2011).
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public include all material information about the company in a prospectus.10
Failure to include material information in the prospectus constitutes a viola-
tion of law under several provisions of U.S. law, including Rule lOb-5 prom-
ulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). 05
The Exchange Act, however, contains multiple exemptions to the
registration and disclosure requirements for the issuance of securities.' 0 6
The private placement exemption would, for example, eliminate any fear
that a closely-held corporate law firm might disclose confidential client
information.
B. The Use ofMDPs and the Resulting
Efficiencies from Collaboration
Like corporate law, the rules governing lawyers are set at the state level
and differ among states. The ABA provides guidance to state bar
associations by providing recommendations on how best to govern the legal
profession and foster professional responsibility.'07 While states are free to
implement their own legal ethics and professional standards, 08 many adopt
all or a majority of the Model Rules, altering rules as they believe necessary
to better serve society and the legal community.109 A few states have started
to experiment with deviations from Model Rule 5.4, pressuring the ABA to
examine the possibility of revising the Rule's prohibition on alternative law
firm structures. 0
This review of Model Rule 5.4 started in 2000, but the ABA has yet to
unanimously endorse and implement any changes."' The ABA has explicitly
104. See id. § 77j.
105. Id. § 78a et seq.; 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2013); Hodge, supra note 54, at 94-
95 (outlining this concern).
106. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (exempting private placements of securities); 17
C.F.R. § 230.501 et seq. (providing the "Regulation D" exemptions for small offer-
ings to accredited investors). Exemptions from periodic reporting requirements also
exist. See 15 U.S.C. § 781; 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (providing minimum thresholds for
periodic reporting under Exchange Act). Note that these exemptions are most useful
for closely-held corporations, since verifying the number of shareholders for a public-
ly traded company is difficult.
107. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preface (2012).
108. Chronological List of States Adopting Model Rules, A.B.A. CTR. PROF.
RESP., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/publications/
model rules of professional conduct/chrono list state adopting model_rules.html
(last visited July 16, 2013) (providing a table of when states have adopted the ABA
Model Rules while noting when states deviate through amendments that differ from
the suggested Model Rules).
109. Id.
110. See infra Part Ill.B.2.
111. See Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Background Paper on Multidis-
ciplinary Practice: Issues and Development, A.B.A. CTR. PROF. RESP. (Jan. 1999),
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stated that it does not believe there is "sufficient basis" to allow law firms to
form corporations.112 In its contemplation of potential alternative business
structures, the ABA appears to only have considered allowing non-lawyer
partnerships with law firms, also known as MDPs.1"3 Consequently, most
states are self-initiating studies and proposals for relaxing their professional
ethics rules1 4 to allow MDPs, which results in divergence from the typical
uniformity among states that generally lends credence to the Model Rules.115
1. MDPs in Practice and Model Rule 5.4
Today, the practice of law is more integrated with non-legal professions
than ever before.16 Legal advice overlaps with a variety of other profession-
al services including tax consulting, real estate, environmental law and the
expertise of scientists, employment law and human resource departments, and
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/commissionmultidis
ciplinarypractice/multicomreport0199.html.
112. News Release, ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20 (Apr. 16, 2012),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/ethics2020/20120416
news release re nonlawyer ownership law firms.authcheckdam.pdf ("Based on the
Commission's extensive outreach, research, consultation, and the response of the
profession, there does not appear to be a sufficient basis for recommending a change
to ABA policy on nonlawyer ownership of law firms.").
113. See Issues Paper from ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 on Alternative
Business Structures to ABA Entities, Courts, Bar Associations, Law Schools, and
Individuals 17 (Apr. 5 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/ethics 2020/abs issuespaper.authcheckdam.pdf ("While
there are various approaches possible, the Working Group is seeking feedback only
with respect to the first three options enumerated below.") (emphasis in original).
114. See Status of Multidisciplinary Practice Studies by State (and Some Local
Bars), A.B.A. CTR. PROF. RESP., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional
responsibility/commission multidisciplinary practice/mdpstate action.html (last
visited July 16, 2013) [hereinafter Status of Multidisciplinary Practice Studies
by State] (detailing the investigation by various states of the pros and cons of
MDP relationships).
115. See id. See generally Laurel S. Terry, The Work of the ABA Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice, in STEVEN I. MCGARRY & LAUREL S. TERRY,
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICES AND PARTNERSHIPS: LAWYERS, CONSULTANTS, AND
CLIENTS 2.20 (2002), available at http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/l/s/1st3/
McGarry%20Mutlidisciplinary%20Ch2.PDF (examining state explorations MDP in
response to the ABA's decision).
116. See, e.g., Status of Multidisciplinary Practice Studies by State, supra note
114 (detailing the positions of various states that are permitting MDP arrangements).
For example, the State Bar of Arizona Task Force on the Future of the Legal Profes-
sion supported MDPs and suggests the ABA amend MRPC 5.4 and other rules, a
California ethics board proposed revisions to the ABA, and Colorado adopted a reso-
lution to allow MDPs. Id.
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accounting and economic advice for business transactions like mergers and
acquisitions. 117 The ABA defines an MDP as:
[A] partnership, professional corporation, or other association or entity
that includes lawyers and nonlawyers and has as one, but not all, of its
purposes the delivery of legal services to a client(s) [sic] other than the
MDP itself or that holds itself out to the public as providing nonlegal,
as well as legal, services. It includes an arrangement by which a law
firm joins with one or more other professional firms to provide ser-
vices . . . and there is a direct or indirect sharing of profits as part of
the arrangement. 18
Model Rule 5.4, entitled "Professional Independence of a Lawyer," explicitly
rejects MDPs by mandating that "[a] lawyer or law firm shall not share legal
fees with a nonlawyer." 1 9 Rule 5.4(b) further states, "A lawyer shall not
form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership
consist of the practice of law."120 This provision, among others, needs to be
revised in order to meet the needs of modem business and legal practice.121
Many professionals remain adamant about curtailing the development of
MDPs in order to protect the professional independence of the lawyer, reduce
conflicts of interests, and maintain client confidentiality and the attorney-
client privilege.12 2 Many practitioners believe that permitting MDPs will
117. See generally Bryant G. Garth & Carole Silver, The MDP Challenge in the
Context of Globalization, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 903 (2002) (exploring the growth
of MDPS in a global context).
118. ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the ABA House of
Delegates, A.B.A. CTR. PROF. RESP. (June 8, 1999), http://www.americanbar.
org/groups/professional responsibility/commission multidisciplinarypractice/mdpre
commendation.html.
19. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a) (2012). This rule is subject to a
few limited exceptions including: (1) paying a lawyer's estate after a lawyer's death,
(2) when a lawyer purchases the legal practice of a deceased attorney, (3) when a
lawyer or law firm compensates employee(s), and (4) when a lawyer shares court-
awarded legal fees with a nonprofit organization which interacted with the lawyer. Id.
120. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) (2012).
121. John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, A Market Approach to Regulating
the Delivery ofLegal Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83,
89 (2000).
122. See generally Kathryn Lolita Yarbrough, Comment, Multidisciplinary Prac-
tices: Are They Already Among Us?, 53 ALA. L. REV. 639, 653-58 (2002) (exploring
opposition to MDPs in the legal profession); John Paul Lucci, Note, New York Revis-
es Ethics Rules to Permit Limited MDPs: A Critical Analysis of the New York Ap-
proach, the Future of the MDP Debate After Enron, and Recommendations for Other
Jurisdictions, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 151, 175-77 (2003) (noting common
arguments from MDP opponents). For example, accountants have disclosure obliga-
tions in stark contrast to lawyers who are mandated to preserve client confidences. Id.
at 168.
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compromise the legal profession's reputation, fearing that lawyers will suc-
cumb to business pressures - perhaps even unconsciously - by settling law-
suits merely to please shareholders.123 Opponents feel MDPs will not be able
to fully protect client interests as the paramount objective and fear that MDPs
will threaten the financial structure of law firms. 124
Despite critics, advocates believe MDPs are inevitable and necessary to
provide clients with the most efficient and affordable legal and non-legal
services.125 MDP advocates criticize the motives of those desiring to prevent
the MDP movement from reaching fruition by labeling their resistance as an
attempt to preserve lawyers' status quo.126 Critics of Model Rule 5.6, which
prevents non-compete agreements among lawyers, similarly argue that the
Model Rules are more concerned with protecting the status of law firms than
serving public policy.127 For example, a California court has observed that
blanket prohibitions, such as forbidding lawyer non-compete agreements, are
not necessarily intended to serve client needs.128 Law firms can simultane-
123. See Tyler Cobb, Note, Have Your Cake and Eat It Too! Appropriately Har-
nessing the Advantages of Nonlawyer Ownership, 54 ARIz. L. REV. 765, 771-74
(2012) (describing and critiquing this argument); James R. DeBuse, Note, Opening at
$25 1/2 Is Big Firm U.S.A.: Why America May Eventually Have a Publicly Traded
Law Firm, and Why Law Firms Can Succeed Without Going Public, 34 J. CORP. L.
317, 336 (2008) (arguing that ownership and interference with professional judgment
are one in the same for law firms).
124. Robert A. Stein, Multidisciplinary Practices: Prohibit or Regulate?, 84
MINN. L. REV. 1529, 1532 (2000) (explaining that many opponents think of MDPs as
a mechanism for the Big Five accounting firms to enter the market of practicing law,
and where nonlawyer supervisors of lawyers would disregard standards of
professional conduct).
125. MDPs can provide clients with "one-stop shopping" for all of their profes-
sional needs. See Stefan F. Tucker, Written Remarks of Stefan F. Tucker Submitted to
the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, A.B.A. CTR. PROF. RESP. (Feb. 4,
1999), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professionalresponsibility/commission
multidisciplinary practice/tuckerl.html. Simultaneously, MDPs will enhance afford-
ability by reducing redundant costs since services can be provided under one business
entity, and the enhanced competition of professional services will create greater ac-
cess to legal services. See Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of
Legal Services, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 42-45 (2012).
126. See, e.g., Letter from Robert Gordon, Professor, Yale Law School, to Sher-
win P. Simmons, Chair, ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (May 21,
1999), available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/
commission multidisciplinarypractice/gordon.html ("[Tihe organized bar's re-
sistance to new modes of practice, though often clothed in the high-minded rhetoric of
protecting the ethical standards and independent judgment of the legal profession, has
been to a considerable extent motivated by far less elevated desires to protect the
incomes of lawyers from economic competition or their status from erosion.").
127. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6 (2012).
128. See Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 160 (Cal. 1993) ("We seek to achieve
a balance between the interest of clients in having the attorney of choice, and the
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ously operate as businesses and maintain high ethical standards; preserving
professional ethics and allowing the business of law to serve clients' needs
are not juxtaposed positions. The arguments of the advocates of MDPs, as
well as California's authorization of lawyer non-compete agreements,
demonstrate how the ABA can loosen restrictions while still maintaining
control of legal ethics through more tailored regulations.
The indistinct line between legal and non-legal services suggests that
professionals already often overlap their services when advising clients.' 29
The traditional role of the lawyer merely as zealous advocate is no longer the
norm; today, lawyers need to be able to assist clients with a number of legal
issues that overlap with issues not traditionally dealt with by a lawyer. In
other words, the needs of clients are not neatly compartmentalized.130 Addi-
tionally, rapid technological advancements and financial globalization sug-
gest that lawyers need to unite with non-legal professionals and that law firms
need to access capital markets in order to be effective in meeting their clients'
needs.' 3 ' Proponents of the ABA endorsing new models for law firms
acknowledge the sensible concern with ethical implications raised by the
MDP structure, but believe that professional conduct regulations can allay
fears and uncertainties.132
interest of law firms in a stable business environment. We have recognized that re-
straint of competition among partners is permissible only to the extent it protects the
reasonable interests of the business seeking the restraint.").
129. See generally Yarbrough, supra note 122, at 658-64 (describing the move-
ment of the "Big Five" accounting firms into traditionally legal fields). The legal
services clients need are not isolated from the other professional services that they are
seeking. Cf Stein, supra note 124, at 1534 (2000) ("Firms currently exist that spe-
cialize in mergers and acquisitions, advising corporations on a variety of issues in-
cluding legal issues, in a merger and acquisition context. These firms include invest-
ment bankers, economists, and lawyers. In addition, financial planners, who may not
be lawyers, give advice, on the application of tax laws to their clients. Human re-
source companies give advice to their clients about employment practices and the
firing of employees. Litigation support firms include technology experts to advise
law firms how to manage litigation more effectively by using new technologies.").
130. See Marsha M. Mansfield & Louise G. Trubek, New Roles to Solve Old
Problems: Lawyering for Ordinary People in Today's Context, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 367, 372 (2012) (arguing that lawyers should seek "insights gleaned from other
professions such as mental health, health care, and business, employ advanced tech-
nologies, and consider the variety of interests that affect the well-being of the clients
beyond simply the bare legal issues.").
131. Stein, supra note 124, at 1531.
132. See, e.g., Edward A. Adams, New Rule Authorizes Discipline of Firms; Re-
sponsibility for Supervision Imposed, 215 N.Y.L.J. 7 (June 4, 1996) (noting that in
1996 New York became the first state in the U.S. to permit disciplining the law firm
in addition to individual lawyers); see also John H. Matheson & Peter D. Favorite,
Multidisciplinary Practice and the Future of the Legal Profession: Considering a
Role for Independent Directors, 32 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 577, 611 (2001) (proposing that
independent legal directors can monitor MDPs and ensure ethical compliance); cf
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2. The Historical Development and the Modem Application of MDPs
Upon the inception of the Canons of Professional Ethics in 1908,
the ABA was silent as to the treatment of MDPs.133 The ABA did not
expressly forbid non-lawyer partnership arrangements in the practice of law
until 1928, fearing that MDPs could lead to the demise of professional inde-
pendence and zealous advocacy of client interests.134 This Rule effectively
prohibited any law firms from adopting a business form or joint venture with
a non-lawyer. 135
The ABA has failed to demonstrate that this Rule lessens the risk of
infringement on independent professional judgment, yet insists that it is the
only necessary and sufficient solution to maintain the independent
professional judgment of attorneys.136 However, not all jurisdictions agree.
The District of Columbia permits partnerships and fee sharing among lawyers
and non-lawyers as long as the entity provides solely legal services.'3 1 Con-
sequently, in D.C. an accountant can assist lawyers in providing clients with
tax advice, psychologists and social workers can assist with child custody
hearings, and lobbyists can work with lawyers to accommodate client
needs. 38 The rule does not limit potential new business forms to partnerships
as it allows firms to engage with non-lawyers in "partnerships or other forms
of organization."' 39 This leaves open the possibility that an MDP could also
be a corporation, as the rule does not prohibit non-lawyer ownership or fee
sharing. However, it does require that all non-lawyer managers be subject to
the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct and provides that lawyers supervising
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1 cmt.2 (2012) (requiring lawyers with
"managerial authority" to provide policies for reasonable assurance that all lawyers in
the firm will conform to the MRPC).
133. See CANONS OF PROF'S ETHICS (1908).
134. See JOHN T. NOONAN & RICHARD W. PAINTER, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER 383, 376, 385 (Foundation Press, 1997).
135. Katherine L. Harrison, Multidisciplinary Practices: Changing the Global
View of the Legal Profession, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 879, 883-84 (2000).
136. Id. at 891-93.
137. See D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2007). All members of
the MDP agree to ethics rules and lawyers agree to take responsibility for non-
lawyers. Id.
138. See Stein, supra note 124, at 1538; see also Mansfield & Trubek, supra note
130, at 368 (explaining that clients are informed and consent to the integration of
legal and non-legal services); cf Garth & Silver, supra note 117, at 913 ("McKee
Nelson in Washington, D.C., a firm that was organized in 1999 by two tax specialists,
describing itself as 'An Independent Law Firm Allied With Ernst & Young.' As of
January 2002, McKee Nelson had positioned itself to offer legal advice on 'tax litiga-
tion, transactional structuring, and capital markets needs of companies doing business
in the global economy.').
139. D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a)(4), 5.4(b), (2007).
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non-lawyers are liable for that person's failure to obey those rules. 40 It ap
pears that this rule would adequately assure compliance with the other rules
and would not otherwise jeopardize a lawyer's independent professional
judgment.
Similarly, in April 2000, after six months of investigating the
advantages and disadvantages of altering the state's ethics rules, a New York
State Bar Association Special Committee recommended permitting MDPs.141
In 2001, the New York Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility Disci-
plinary Rule 1-107 authorized the integration of lawyer and non-lawyer
services by allowing lawyers and law firms to pursue contractual relation-
ships with non-legal professionals or non-legal firms, subject to certain
conditions.142 Non-legal professionals had to meet certain requirements, such
as: (1) have a minimum of a bachelor's degree and be on a list retained by the
New York Appellate Division, (2) be occupied in a position licensed by
the State of New York or a federal agency, and (3) adhere to professional
conduct that is comparable to lawyers' ethical requirements.143 In addition,
the non-legal professionals could not control the lawyer or law firm or
share profits earned by the lawyer or law firm.144 However, DR 1-107 still
expressly prohibits MDPs as non-lawyers do not share "the core values of the
legal profession." 45
Other professional groups are interested in joining law firms, whether
through MDPs or contractual procedures, as is allowed in New York.146 In
the 1990s, accounting firms advocated for MDPs, but the calamities of Enron
and WorldCom halted MDP development in the United States.147 Looking
140. Id.
141. N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N SPECIAL COMM. ON THE LAW GOVERNING FIRM
STRUCTURE & OPERATION, PRESERVING THE CORE VALUES OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROFESSION: THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS 1 (Apr. 2000), available at http://www.law.comell.edu/ethics/mdpl.htm.
142. See Roy Simon, The DR 1-107 Definition of a Non-Legal "Professional,"
N.Y. PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY REP. 1 (Feb. 2002).
143. Id. at 2.
144. Lucci, supra note 122, at 185.
145. N.Y. COMP. CODES. R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 5.8 (West, Westlaw
through 35 N.Y. Reg. (July 17, 2013)) (also known as DR 1-107).
146. See Lucci, supra note 122, at 162-63.
147. See NOONAN & PAINTER, supra note 134, at 376, 383, 385. Accounting firm
Arthur Anderson played the dual role of accountant and consultant, which arguably
created improper motives and a conflict of interest. Bumele V. Powell, The Lesson of
Enron for the Future of MDPs: Out of the Shadows and into the Sunlight, 80 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1291, 1296 (2002). Many scholars emphasize the reduced ethical obligations
of nonlawyers, fearing that MDP arrangements could hinder the legal reputation and
independence. See Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Transcript, Report to
the House of Delegates (Aug. 1999), available at http://www.americanbar.
org/groups/professionalresponsibility/commission multidisciplinarypractice/mdph
ouse.html. But see Powell, supra, at 1296 (arguing that the Enron debacle demon-
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beyond the scope of the ABA, many foreign countries permit lawyer and non-
lawyer professional arrangements.148 In fact, the United States' "Big Five"
accounting firms have engaged in legal markets abroad.149 Accounting firms
want to collaborate with law firms to enhance the services that they can offer,
and many clients want an integrated professional service to meet their busi-
ness needs. However, the Model Rules have halted this development.
3. The ABA's Current Position on MDPs
Though many jurisdictions have unilaterally initiated rules that would
allow firms to adopt alternative business structures, the ABA has continued to
stand by its prohibition even as its own investigations and committees have
questioned the continued ban.'50 in 1998, a commission was appointed to
review the possibility of allowing MDPs.' 5 1 Ultimately, the commission re-
ported that the ABA should both allow lawyers to share fees with
non-lawyers and authorize professional partnerships consisting of lawyer and
non-lawyer professionals.152 Nonetheless, the ABA House of Delegates was
not convinced that the new forms would protect a lawyer's independent
professional judgment.153
Consequently, the evidence in favor of MDPs and the push-back the
ABA is receiving from firms should require the ABA to continue to either
justify its position or to "examine" the implications of MD3Ps on ethical com-
pliance. The ABA will continue to examine whether the ethics rules should
be modified to permit MDPs. This examination will emphasize three princi-
ples: "protecting the public; preserving core professional values; and main-
taining a strong, independent, and self-regulated profession."' 54 In August
strates the need for MDPs because legal oversight helps inform clients of liability
risks and ethical obligations).
148. See infra Part IV.
149. Adam A. Schulenburger, Note, Would You Like Fries with That? The Future
of Multidisciplinary Practice, 87 IOWA L. REV. 327, 333 (2001); see also Garth &
Silver, supra note 117, at 908.
150. Terry, supra note 115, at 2.13-2.19; see also Stein, supra note 124, at 1539-
45 (providing a detailed history of the ABA Commission and House of Delegates
decision-making process, in which all participants had unanimously recommended
permitting MDP arrangements subject to limitations).
151. See Stein, supra note 124, at 1539.
152. See Terry, supra note 115, at 2.14.
153. Id. at 2.6-2.10.
154. Discussion Paper from ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 on Alternative
Law Practice Structures, (Dec. 2, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics 2020/20111202-ethics2020-discussion_
draft-alps.authcheckdam.pdf. The report further summarized:
The Commission has ruled out certain forms of nonlawyer ownership that cur-
rently exist in other countries. In particular, the Commission rejected: (a)
publicly traded law firms, (b) passive, outside nonlawyer investment or own-
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2012, the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, after conducting three years of
research, decided it would revisit the issue of MDPs, including perhaps de-
veloping suggestions for modifying the current Model Rules. 55
IV. GLOBALIZATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
The practice of law has not been sheltered from the forces of globaliza-
tion. Regulators and practicing lawyers have both been forced to reconsider
the assumptions underpinning the practice of law that have been traditionally
defined by its domestic reach. 15 As the U.S. debate over law firm structure
continues, other countries like the United Kingdom and Australia have enact-
ed changes to increase the flexibility of the law firm structure and invite out-
side equity into law firms.'5 7 This Part seeks to review those changes and the
motivations that spurred them, and concludes by discussing how international
reform and the pressures of globalization may affect the debate over law firm
structure here in the United States.
A. Reform in Australia and the United Kingdom
For many U.S. law firms, the practice of law is no longer contained
within the country's borders.' 58  Many U.S. firms have offices abroad,159
and foreign firms have offices in the United States.'60 Australia and the Unit-
ership in law firms, and (c) multidisciplinary practices (i.e., law firms that of-
fer both legal and non-legal services separately in a single entity).
Id. at 1.
155. Memorandum from Jamie S. Gorelick & Michael Traynor, Co-Chairs of the
ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 regarding the Final Revised Drafts of First Set of
Commission Proposals, (Feb. 21, 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics 2020/20120221 ethics 20 20 circulation_
cover memorevised august_2012_proposalsforcomment.authcheckdam.pdf
(proposing, inter alia, "a new sentence to Comment [16] to Rule 1.6 that explicitly
states that the disclosure of information, by itself, does not constitute a violation of
the proposed Rule 1.6(c) if a lawyer took reasonable precautions to guard against it.").
156. See infra Part IV.B.
157. See infra Part IV.A.
158. See generally Krause, supra note 70.
159. Anthony Davis, A New Approach to Law Firm Regulation, AM. LAW. DAILY
(July 22, 2010), available at LexisNexis. American firms historically dominated the
international legal market. Id.
160. See Steven Mark, Harmonization or Homogenization?: The Globalization of
Law and Legal Ethics - An Australian Viewpoint, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1173,
1182-83 (2001) (noting that as companies develop increasingly global interests, busi-
nesses have begun seeking law firms that understand the laws in multiple countries
and can provide services for cross-border transactions); Carole Silver, Regulatory
Mismatch in the International Market for Legal Services, 23 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
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ed Kingdom in particular have modernized law firm structures within their
jurisdictions to enable the firms to be more competitive internationally.161
The motivations for reform in these two countries share similarities as well
as differences. Understanding the factors that led Australia and the United
Kingdom to change the form of the law firm structure offers a glimpse
into what pressures may lead the United States to consider and implement
similar changes.
Australia's Legal Profession Act 2004 enabled law firms to adopt the
corporate form.162 The change was not sudden.163 The state of New South
Wales introduced limited MDPs to Australia through the Legal Profession
Act 1987. ' Despite the availability of the MDP, restrictions designed to
preserve potential ethical conflicts limited their use. 6' Nevertheless, the use
of MDPs motivated Australian regulators to begin thinking about the practice
of law as a business that should be governed by competitive practices.166
During the late 1990s, regulators determined that the restrictions on MDPs
were anti-competitive; as a result, the restrictions were removed. In 2001,
New South Wales became the first jurisdiction in the world to legalize the
corporate structure for law firms.' 68
A unique set of motivations led to the widespread adoption of the 2004
Act.169 First, lawyers were facing increasing competition from non-lawyers
over basic legal services.170 Several Australian jurisdictions allowed MDPs
to exist, and the effect was the erosion of traditional legal services being per-
formed solely by lawyers. 171 Second, Australian law firm partnerships did
487, 527-28 (2003) (noting the practice of foreign law firms opening offices in the
U.S began in the early 1970's).
161. Davis, supra note 159.
162. Petzold, supra note 56, at 68-69.
163. Id at 73-74.
164. Steven Mark & Georgina Cowdroy, Incorporated Legal Practices - A New
Era in the Provision of Legal Services in the State of New South Wales, 22 PENN. ST.
INT'L L. REV. 671, 673 (2004).
165. Id. at 673 (describing two restrictions on MDPs: (1) lawyers were required to
maintain majority voting rights over the participating non-lawyers, and (2) lawyers
were required to retain at least 5 1 % of the net income).
166. See Mark, supra note 160, at 1194-95.
167. See Mark & Cowdroy, supra note 164, at 673.
168. See id. at 674 (chronically New South Wales's passage of the Legal Profes-
sion Act 2000 and the Legal Profession Regulation 2001); Mark, supra note 160, at
1195 ("[T]o date, New South Wales has been the only jurisdiction in ... the world to
allow legal entities - including MDPs - to incorporate as businesses.").
169. Petzold, supra note 56, at 73-74.
170. Id. at 75.
171. See Mark, supra note 160, at 1198-99. The struggle to define the scope of
the "practice of law" led many non-lawyers to get involved in fields traditionally
practiced by only lawyers. Id. at 1198. Uncompetitive law firm structure may partial-
ly explain how lawyers became effectively barred from practicing traditional lawyer
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not enjoy the benefits of limited liability to the same extent as U.S. firms do
today.172 Third, because each of Australia's states legislates its own rules
and regulations regarding the practice of law,17 3 a lack of uniformity limited
the true availability of the corporate form. In 2004, to further the goals
of uniformity and competitiveness both domestically and internationally, the
Law Council of Australia adopted the National Legal Professional Model
Provisions. 17 4 This set the stage for the Legal Profession Act 2004.' With
the passage of the Act, incorporated law firms no longer had to concern
themselves with regulatory conflicts in states that would not allow a publicly
owned law firm to enter the market. Up until the passage of the Act,
every corporate firm remained privately held. Widespread adoption of
the Act allowed Slater & Gordon, the poster child of publicly-owned law
firms, to seek public capitalization, and it is now traded on the Australian
Stock Exchange.176
The United Kingdom also undertook dramatic reform of its legal system
when it enacted the Legal Services Act 2007.177 Sir David Clementi prepared
a report in 2004 on behalf of the United Kingdom government which con-
cluded that the regulations were "outdated, inflexible, over-complex, and
insufficiently accountable or transparent."1 78 Similar to Australia, the need
for increased competition, efficiency, and consumer satisfaction in legal ser-
vices were the main justifications for reform. 179 The resulting Act created -
among other reforms - "alternative business structures," allowing non-lawyer
functions; this reason at the very least was at the heart of Australia's reform. Petzold,
supra note 56, at 76.
172. See Petzold, supra note 56, at 77. The consequences of such extensive liabil-
ity were that law firms had to be constantly on alert for malpractice suits, and were
forced to develop prophylactic measures in anticipation. Id. Such measures included
"running bare," by holding small amounts of insurance and limiting the assets in the
firm to minimize damages. Id.
173. See Mark, supra note 160, at 1176.
174. See Petzold, supra note 56, at 74. For comparison, the Law Council of Aus-
tralia functions much like the ABA, as a national advocacy group for lawyers, and the
National Legal Professional Model Provisions are equally similar to the Model Rules
advocated by the ABA. While not authoritative, they serve to unify the professional
rules among jurisdictions. Our Role, LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTL., http://www. lawcoun-
cil.asn.au/lawcouncil/index.php/about-the-law-council-of-australialour-role (last visit-
ed Aug. 19, 2013).
175. See Petzold, supra note 56, at 74.
176. Richard Lloyd, British Firms are Watching Australia's Law Firm IPOs with
Interest, AM. LAW. DAILY (June 6, 2007), available at LexisNexis.
177. See Petzold, supra note 56, at 82.
178. DAVID CLEMENTI, REVIEW OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL
SERVICES IN ENGLAND AND WALES, FINAL REPORT 1 (2004) (emphasis omitted).
179. Petzold, supra note 56, at 82. Consumer complaints were common, con-
sistent, and well-documented. Id. at 86. The thought was that the problem was not
with individual lawyers and firms, but that the entire system was faulty. Id. at 82.
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investment in firms, subject to a fit to own test for shareholders seeking to
own more than ten percent.180
Chief among the reasons for reform in both Australia and the United
Kingdom was the call for competitiveness and efficiency in the practice of
law. Australia's focus on competitiveness was based partly on both inter-
national and domestic pressures.182 Trade in transnational legal services was
declining in the early 2000s, 83 and lawmakers saw liberalization as a neces-
sary step for Australia to compete on a global level. 184 The push for liberali-
zation through the elimination of anti-competitive rules also dominated dis-
cussions about the fragmented state of professional rules.'85
In the United Kingdom, however, the push for increasing competition
shared only a few similarities with the Australian experience. On one hand,
like Australia, the increasing participation in the market for basic legal ser-
vices by non-lawyers was pervasive enough to convince regulators and practi-
tioners that change was needed.186 However, this problem could have been
fixed simply by tightening the definition of what constitutes the practice of
law and reserving more basic services for lawyers.187 The true source of zeal
for competition policy in the United Kingdom began when the Labour Party
came back into power in 1997 and began strongly pushing a free-market
agenda.' Consumer dissatisfaction with legal services prompted lawmakers
to reevaluate the system.189 The Legal Services Act was the culmination of
180. See Cox, supra note 37, at 536-37 (Whether an outside investors is fit to own
may be "conditioned on approval of the investor's "probity and financial position," as
determined by the licensing authority.").
181. Petzold, supra note 56, at 82.
182. Id. at 75.
183. See Mark, supra note 160, at 1186-87 ("By 1997-98, exports had risen to
$207 million and imports were eighty- three million dollars, with a surplus of $124
million. The latest figures, however, reveal that exports have stagnated - to around
two hundred million dollars in the past two years - while legal service imports have
fallen by a dramatic forty percent in 1999-2000.").
184. Id. at 1187-89 (discussing reforms aimed at reducing restrictions on foreign
lawyers).
185. Id. at 1189 (noting that efforts to harmonize fragmented professional rules
among states by the Law Council of Australia, other bar associations, and regulators
focused on the promotion of competition policy).
186. See Petzold, supra note 56, at 83.
187. See Christopher J. Whelan, The Paradox of Professionalism: Global Law
Practice Means Business, 27 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 465, 471 (2008) ("Traditionally,
in the U.K., there have been very few restrictions on offering legal advice and assis-
tance. Most legal services can be offered by anyone for free or for a fee. Some im-
portant legal services are "reserved" . . . [h]owever, the list is relatively short.").
188. See Petzold, supra note 56, at 81-82.
189. Id. at 86.
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the belief that liberalizing business structures would increase responsiveness
to consumers.190
The pressures that prompted change in Australia and the United King-
dom do not exist to the same extent in the United States. Differences both in
policy preferences and the systems of regulation explain why a similar push
to remove restrictions on law firm structure has not taken off in the United
States. The U.S. legal profession is self-regulated by the courts,'91 not by
legislation.192 Although some have criticized the model as a failure,' 93 the
ABA remains committed to the justifications for self-regulation.1 94 With both
Australia and the United Kingdom, the move to allow publicly-owned firms
came by way of legislation. The Legal Services Act also created the Legal
Services Board to oversee all legal regulation due to the consumer com-
plaints that the system was not providing adequate access to justice.196 Addi-
tional political sources of reform in the United Kingdom and Australia stem
from antitrust regulators and consumer advocacy groups, interests which have
little impact on the regulation of U.S. lawyers.' 97
The competitive pressures in the United Kingdom and Australia are also
manifestly lacking in the United States. The historical pressure on lawyers to
compete with non-lawyers for legal services in these countries is a relative
non-issue in the United States.'9 The ABA has aggressively attempted to
190. Id. at 86-87.
191. See, e.g., Whelan, supra note 187, at 467.
192. This is not entirely true. See Ted Schneyer, Thoughts on the Compatibility of
Recent U.K. andAustralian Reforms with U.S. Traditions in Regulating Law Practice,
2009 J. PROF. LAw. 13, 16 (2009) (citing section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
SEC regulations as examples of "piecemeal" regulations that do not interfere or re-
place basic features of the self- regulatory system).
193. Fred C. Zacharias, The Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice:
Confronting Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 44
ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 831 (2002) (arguing that regulators rely on "idealizations about
lawyers or the practice of law" when drafting or amending rules).
194. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Eco-
nomic Cost ofProfessional Control Over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV.
1689, 1697-98 (2008).
195. See Whelan, supra note 187, at 475-76 ("One of the most striking features
of the reforms is the extent to which regulators are now independent of the legal
profession.").
196. See id (noting that the board consists of lay people, and that one of its prima-
ry objectives is to ensure consumer confidence in the legal profession). All com-
plaints about the legal profession are also now handled by an independent regulatory
body. Id. at 477.
197. See Schneyer, supra note 192, at 25 (noting further that "the 'state action'
doctrine in federal antitrust law immunizes state court rules governing law practice
and firm structure from antitrust scrutiny . . .").
198. See Petzold, supra note 56, at 96-97. Because maintaining a strict definition
of what constitutes legal work is inherently difficult due to the natural overlap of
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define the practice of law and persuade states to maintain and enforce laws
that prevent non-lawyers from practicing traditionally-legal functions.'99 The
scheme of self-regulation, combined with the attitude that legal functions
should be confined to legal practice, stems from the belief that the practice of
law is a "profession" rather than merely a business.200 This assumption,
while being questioned by many legal scholars in the United States, at least
partially insulates the industry from criticisms that the rules impede pure
competition. This is somewhat tautological, as it is the competitive pressures
in the United Kingdom and Australia that have eroded the conception of law
as something other than a business. Until the United States begins to feel that
its law firms are threatened by inflexible business structures, the calls for
reform will be minimal. However, global pressures may create those threats
and lead the United States down the path of outside equity in law firms.
B. Pressures of Globalization on U.S. Policy
Differences between the American system of law and the United King-
dom and Australian systems help explain why the United States is watching
the effects of firm-structure reform unfold overseas instead of seriously en-
gaging in reform discussions itself. However, the forces of globalization in
conjunction with these reforms abroad may still impact the future of U.S.
regulatory policy. Globalization is a tricky concept to define, and it carries
with it several different but important meanings. 20 Globalization is charac-
terized by the removal of barriers between countries and the increasing flow
202
of goods, people, and ideas around the world. Economics, governance, and
culture are all forces of globalization that affect the practice of law. 203
some legal and non-legal services, the problem exists on some level in the U.S., but
the fear of criminal sanctions minimizes the problem. See Charles W. Wolfram, Mul-
tidisciplinary Partnerships in the Law Practice of European and American Lawyers,
in LAWYER'S PRACTICE AND IDEALS: A COMPARATIVE VIEw 329-31 (John J. Barcelo
& Roger Cramton, eds., 1999).
199. See, e.g., Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, MDP Recommendation,
A.B.A. CTR. PROF. RESP. (July 13, 2000), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/profes-
sional responsibility/commission multidisciplinarypractice/mdprecom I Of.html
(noting the "lawyer's duty to help maintain a single profession of law").
200. See generally, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT PREAMBLE AND SCOPE
COMMENT 10, available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional respon-
sibilty/publications/model rules_of professional conduct/model rules of profession
alconduct preamblescope.html (noting that the practice of law is a self-govern-
ing profession).
201. See Jonathan Goldsmith, The Core Values of the Legal Profession for Law-
yers Today and Tomorrow, 28 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 441, 443-44 (2008).
202. See id.
203. See id.
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The practice of law has become increasingly global, growing exponen-
tially since the mid-1980s.204 This trend is exemplified by increases both in
the trade of legal services and in the number of law firms that have estab-
lished offices worldwide.205 As corporations have gone transnational, the
need for transactional services covering multiple national jurisdictions has
206increased. And as transactions become increasingly complex, spanning
multiple countries in law and location, law firms that want to compete must
develop an international presence.207
Free market economic rationalism accompanies these trends as the dom-
inant economic theory of globalization.208 Firms in London now compete
directly with firms in New York, a reality that has consequences for the con-
sideration of law firm structure.209 The practice of law is increasingly seen as
210
the practice of business on the global level. Clients demand cost-
effectiveness, and the sheer number of firms competing for their business
means that they will get it. In a world where competitiveness demands effi-
ciency, the policy choices of the United Kingdom and Australia undoubtedly
affect U.S. law firms.
In terms of pure economic competition, there are two main ways that the
U.S. insistence on the partnership model might disadvantage U.S. firms.
First, the ethical justifications for banning outside capital demand a certain
level of "quality" of representation by U.S. firms that the new liberalized
programs do not. In particular, prohibiting U.S. firms from offering non-legal
services might make them less attractive to clients searching for a one-stop
shop. If there are ethical trade-offs with the liberalized structure, then the
policymakers of the United Kingdom and Australia are comfortable with
them. In a market economy, the consumer dictates business. If corporate
clients are willing to accept the risk of a violation of the professional rules for
a cheaper price tag offered by firms in Australia and the United Kingdom,
then U.S. firms may be shut out of the market for those "lower quality" ser-
vices.211 For example, the increasing practice of outsourcing legal work pre-
204. James R. Faulconbridge et al., Global Law Firms: Globalization and Organ-
izational Spaces of Cross-Border Legal Work, 28 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 455,
456 (2008).
205. Id.
206. Id at 457-58.
207. See Mark, supra note 160, at 1182-83.
208. See id. 1174-75.
209. See Faulconbridge et al., supra note 204, at 457-58.
210. See id. at 465 (noting that law firms that practice globally tend to have
competitive advantages, such as "technology, management and marketing" over
local firms).
211. See Mark Tuft, Supervising Offshore Outsourcing of Legal Services in a
Global Environment: Re-examining Current Ethical Standards, 43 AKRON L. REV.
825, 844 (2010) (examining the ethical difficulties presented by outsourcing legal
work to contract lawyers or lawyers outside of the United States).
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sents ethical dilemmas, and the Model Rules require the outsourcing lawyer
to manage and supervise the outsourced work in order to avoid an ethics vio-
212lation. The attendant ethical duties for the supervision of outsourced law-
yers require the supervisor to ensure that the outsourced lawyer is in compli-
ance with all of the ethical rules.213 The supervision of non-lawyers requires
that they are not engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.214 Competitive
complications may arise in the form of higher transaction costs or because
competing codes of professional conduct have more relaxed rules regarding,
for example, the unauthorized practice of law.
The second potential disadvantage to U.S. firms is a capital disad-
vantage. Large infusions of capital investments may give firms in the United
Kingdom and Australia a head start on global expansion and encourage inno-
vation. Some argue that law firms are not traditionally capital-intensive, and
do not need a heavy dose of equity investment in order to expand. However,
that argument is only true when comparing law firms of the same structure.
When law firms compete, the organizational structures compete as well. Op-
portunities to take on additional risk, either in specific cases or in expansion
decisions, demand flexibility and adaptability. 215 There are several examples
of these opportunities where a capital advantage could be decisive. One is the
potential for large-scale corporate law firm mergers. Following liberaliza-
tion, markets tend to consolidate as a result of either mergers or rapid
growth.216 Another opportunity may also allow those law firms to "invest" in
lawyers, where London firms poach successful New York partners. 217
Whether these turn out to be profitable strategies remains to be seen, but it is
at least clear that firms without these capital contributions will likely be una-
ble to compete for those opportunities.
V. ANALYSIS
In 1977, prior to the enactment of the Model Rules, the ABA formed the
Commission on the Evaluation of Professional Standards (Kutak Commis-
212. See id. at 826, 844.
213. See id. at 829-30.
214. Id. at 831.
215. For example, a U.S. firm, bound by Model Rule 5.4, considering expansion
in Australia will be faced with the same competitive dilemma that Australian law
firms faced when they competed with non-lawyers for basic legal services under the
old rules.
216. See STEPHEN DAVIES, THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF PARTNERSHIP
RESTRICTIONS IN THE LEGAL SERVICES SECTOR AND THEIR POSSIBLE REMOVAL 13
(2005), available at http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/107435/107584/da-
vies.pdf.
217. See Ron Zapata, U.S. Law Firm IPOs Inevitable, Legal Scholars Say,
LAw360 (Apr. 1, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/51864/u-s-law-
firm-ipos-inevitable-legal-scholars-say.
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sion) to examine whether the ABA should revise or replace the then-current
Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 2 18 The Kutak Commission rec-
ommended a proposed rule 5.4 that focused on lawyer conduct rather than
law firm structure, resulting in a proposed rule that would have allowed non-
lawyer investment in and managerial control of law firms. 219 The proposed
rule would have also permitted law firms to incorporate and be publicly trad-
ed.220 Thus, the proposed rule would likely have accomplished the goals of
allowing: (1) law firms to incorporate and access capital; (2) alternatively-
structured law firms to flourish, with lawyers having the ability to engage in
business arrangements and fee-sharing agreements with non-lawyers; and (3)
law firms to decide whether to go public. Unfortunately, opponents presented
several arguments addressing why ownership or management of law firms by
non-lawyers was potentially harmful.221 These arguments resonated with the
ABA House of Delegates, which rejected the Kutak Commission's proposed
rule and instead adopted the current Rule 5.4.222 Recognizing that "expand-
ing technology, the globalization of financial markets, and increased govern-
ment regulation had reshaped client demand for legal services," 223 the ABA
formed the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice in 1998.224 In 2000,
twenty-three years after the Kutak Commission's recommendation, the
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice acknowledged that the Model
Rules were inappropriate in light of global developments;225 however, the
recommendation was once again overshadowed by ethical concerns and the
Rules remain unchanged thirteen years later.226
Maintaining the Rules in their current form has stymied U.S. law firms
by preventing access to much-needed infusions of capital and restricting al-
ternative firm structures that could result in increased efficiency and competi-
218. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 1.12 (3d
ed. 2009).
219. See Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?:
A Proposal for Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 8 (1998).
See, e.g., KAN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2007); Mo. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 4-5.4 (2007); NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-505.4 (2008).
220. Adams & Matheson, supra note 219, at 9.
221. ABA, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982-2005, 580-81 (2006).
222. Matthew W. Bish, Revising Model Rule 5.4: Adopting a Regulatory Scheme
that Permits Nonlawyer Ownership and Management of Law firms, 48 WASHBURN
L.J. 669, 670 (2009).
223. Id. at 678.
224. Ryan S. Christensen, Roosters in the Henhouse? How Attorney-Accountant
Partnerships Would Benefit Consumers and Corporate Clients, 37 J. CORP. L. 911,
914 (2012).
225. See id. at 918.
226. See id
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tive advantages.227 The Rules need to be modified to allow U.S. law firms to
effectively compete in the global legal services industry. Such modifications
could be paired with mandated disclosures and clauses in articles of incorpo-
ration or bylaws to prevent the concerns raised by opponents of the Kutak
Commission's recommendations.
A. The ABA Needs to Modify the Model Rules to Address the Legal
Needs of a Changing Society
As global society changes, so do its legal needs and, subsequently, so
does the means by which the legal profession addresses those needs. In 2000,
the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice acknowledged the impact of
forces upon society and the legal profession, and the disconnect between the
Model Rules and our changing society.228 Among the needs identified were
improved access to legal services and greater transparency of law firm man-
agement and operations. 229 Twelve years later, the ABA continues to refrain
from modifying Model Rules 5.1 and 5.4 to align with the realities of the
world in which they are to operate. To address the changing legal needs of
society, including the aforementioned needs for access and transparency, the
ABA needs to embrace that which scholars and commentators propose, Aus-
tralia and the United Kingdom permit, and some state legislatures have con-
templated: enabling law firms to incorporate and engage in alternative busi-
ness structures, with limitations.
1. Alternative Business Structures Are Mutually Beneficial to Law
Firms and Interested Parties
The flexibility of the alternative business structure is mutually beneficial
to law firms and interested parties. The alternative business structure vehicle
provides firms with greater access to the capital markets as well as flexibility
of funds and management structures.230 Increased access to capital allows
law firms to more heavily invest in technology, knowledge management sys-
tems, and new lawyer training.231 Investment in these resources enables law
firms to deliver higher-quality legal services more efficiently. In addition, the
227. See Hodge, supra note 54, at 92-93.
228. See Christensen, supra note 224, at 918.
229. Id. (The ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice listed forces that
have impacted society and the legal profession including: client interest in more effi-
cient and less costly legal services; advances in technology and telecommunications;
globalization; and lack of lawyer accountability.).
230. See Neil Rose, Top Consumer Law Firm Targets Tie-Up with Big Brands
After Receiving ABS License, LEGALFUTURES (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www. legalfu-
tures.co.uk/latest-news/exclusive-top-consumer-law-firm-targets-tie-up-big-brands-
receiving-abs-licence [hereinafter Rose, Top Consumer Law Firm].
231. See MacEwen et al., supra note 51, at 84.
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flexibility of the alternative business structure permits strategic partnering of
attorneys with other professionals. 232 As a result, law firms would have the
233
ability to target a greater number of client types. Firms would be able to
continue assisting those clients most in need, but could also cater to other
client types with varied issues.234
Existing and prospective clients and the general public would also reap
the benefits of law firms adopting alternative business structures. Today's
clients, irrespective of their classification or socio-economic statuses, often
have legal needs that are inseparable from their other professional service
235th
needs. Investments in the working and human capital at a firm would ena-
ble the firm to address the multidisciplinary issues of their clients. In turn,
clients would find the alternative business structure appealing as a convenient
one-stop shop that could offer a comprehensive solution to their legal and
non-legal issues.
2. Cost of Capital and Pubic Demand Compel Law Firms to Increase
Transparency Regardless of Their Governance Structure
Proponents of law firms incorporating and adopting alternative business
structures appreciate that limitations on governance structures need apply.
For instance, increased access to capital and flexibility of funds would result
in a need for greater transparency of law firms.236 The rationale is two-fold.
The cost of capital (particularly public capital) includes a tangible social cost,
one that manifests itself through the general public's demand for transparen-
237
cy. Parties with vested interests in incorporated or alternative business
232. See Neil Rose, Focus: Alternative Business Structures - Law and New Or-
der, THE LAWYER (Nov. 6, 2011), http://www.thelawyer.com/news-and-analysis/the-
lawyer-management/abs-news-and-analysis/focus-altemative-business-structures-law-
and-new-order/1010138.article [hereinafter Rose, Alternative Business Structures]
(Alternative business structures in the United Kingdom are recognized as purposeful
entities that function as tools for law firms to employ strategically in building global
and diverse practice rather than simply ends in themselves); see also Rose, Top Con-
sumer Law Firm, supra note 230.
233. See Rose, Alternative Business Structures, supra note 232.
234. See Hodge, supra note 54, at 92 (Law firms can afford taking on riskier cli-
ent types or contingency fee cases with high pay-off potential).
235. See Cliff Ennico, How to Hire an Attorney, ENTREPRENEUR, http://www.
entrepreneur.com/article/58326-1 (last visited Aug. 19, 2013) (urging that every busi-
ness needs a lawyer to handle the intricacies of the law and further the ultimate suc-
cess of the business).
236. See generally Studer, supra note 94, at 1.
237. See SADOK EL GHOUL ET AL., DOES CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
AFFECT THE COST OF CAPITAL? 3-4 (July 2010), available at http://www.edwards.
usask.ca/centres/csfm/ files/presentations/dev%20mishra.pdf (arguing that socially
responsible companies have higher valuation and lower risk, creating incentives to
demonstrate a commitment to socially beneficial practices).
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structure law firms, such as investors, employees, and clients (existing and
prospective), should be able to obtain general information on the firm.
Here we suggest transparency of the firm financials, at a basic and unob-
trusive level. Though law firms may cringe at the idea of increased transpar-
ency of their financials, they likely will be willing to pay the price in order to
incorporate or adopt alternative business structures. Experience shows that
publicly-traded law firms in Australia and the United Kingdom are willing to
make this sacrifice.238 The best means by which to achieve this financial
transparency is through a disclosure requirement. Consider the financial in-
dustry and the SEC's mandatory disclosure requirements.239 In order to re-
spond to such criticisms and continue as a self-governing profession,24 0 law
firms should be subject to disclosure requirements analogous to those im-
posed by the SEC,241 regardless of the firms' governance structures.
B. There Should Be Mandatory Disclosure ofBasic Financial
Information for All Incorporated Law Firms and Other Law Firms
Employing 100 or More Attorneys
"Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most ef-
ficient policeman."24 2 Regardless of the applicability of securities laws to an
incorporated law firm,243 any state that allows law firms to assume a corpo-
rate structure should require the disclosure of basic financial documentation.
States, of course, would be perfectly free to set the terms of use for incorpo-
rated law firms, just as they are free (within the confines of federal preemp-
tion) to implement their own security "blue sky" laws. Indeed, the benefits of
this disclosure are significant enough that the disclosures should be required
of all law firms with more than 100 lawyers, regardless of governance struc-
ture. For too long the finances of large law firms have been sheltered from
public view,244 avoiding the scrutiny of investors, employees, and prospective
238. See Lloyd, supra note 176.
239. See, e.g., SEC, FORM X- I 7A-5, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/
nasdaqllcfla4 5/g_secform.pdf (last visited July 21, 2013) (requiring brokers and
dealers to disclose basic financial information and an audited balance sheet on a
quarterly basis).
240. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT PREAMBLE AND SCOPE
COMMENT 10, supra note 200.
241. See generally SEC, FINANCIAL REPORTING MANUAL, available at
http://www. sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cffinancialreportingmanual.shtml (last visited
Aug. 19, 2013) (outlining SEC's financial disclosure requirements).
242. LoUIs BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1914).
243. See supra Part Ill.A.3.
244. See Grand, supra note 89, at 391 ("The SEC requires national exchanges
such as the NYSE and NASDAQ to de-list companies that do not comply with its
disclosure and audit rules; law firms face no similar consequences. And there is no
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employees alike.245 Large law firms should be required to disclose financial
information for both the good of the general public and the good of lawyers.
A disclosure requirement would simply extend the normal requirements
for a business to furnish books and records to its stakeholders, recognizing
that the general public has a stake in the provision of legal services. It would
also be similar to the requirement that other professionals, such as broker-
dealers, furnish basic information to the public regarding the financial situa-
246tion of their firms. A shareholder already has a limited right to inspect the
books and records of a corporation.247 A partner has a similar right to access
the books and records of the partnership, as well as information reasonably
required to properly exercise the partner's functions. 248 These rights of ac-
cess mean that a mandatory disclosure regime would only expand the ability
to find financial information beyond the direct owners of the partnership or
corporation. There is little reason not to provide freely to the public that
which must already be furnished to the ownership of a firm. The cost of dis-
tributing this information is not a concern, simply because it could be done
electronically.249 Because the public has a similar interest to the partners in
understanding and knowing the finances of a law firm, all firms of over 100
lawyers should be required to make minimally-intrusive financial disclosures
available to the public.
1. Disclosure Would Benefit Attorneys and Prospective Employees
Attorneys should welcome the implementation of disclosure require-
ments for large law firms. The current lack of information regarding internal
firm finances can lead to the sudden and spectacular collapse of large law
firms with hardly any notice.250 This sudden collapse is possible because of
threat of a shareholder class action for breach of fiduciary duty to strike fear among
law firm partnerships as it does among directors of public companies.").
245. But see Cox, supra note 37, at 523 ("Hiring partners and recruiters have
noticed that, in contrast to flush times when candidates are chiefly concerned about
personal fit and compensation, they now ask 'more specific questions about the
financial history, equity levels, borrowing habits and financing plans of the firms they
are considering."').
246. See, e.g., SEC, FORM X- I 7A-5, supra note 239.
247. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 220 (West, Westlaw through 79 Laws
2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.461 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Regular Sess.).
248. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 403 (2012).
249. See Electronic Records Transition: What's Your Status?, IRON MOUNTAIN,
http://www.ironmountain.com/Knowledge-Center/Reference-Library/View-by-
Document-Type/General-Articles/E/Electronic-Records-Transition-Whats-Your-
Status.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2013) (asserting that using electronic records reduces
costs, boosts efficiency, and decreases data error).
250. See, e.g., Linda Sandler & Sophia Pearson, After Dewey & LeBoeuf It's
Lawyers v. Lawyers, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 31, 2012), http://www. busi-
nessweek.com/articles/2012-05-31 /after-dewey-and-leboeuf-its-lawyers-v-dot-
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the ability of a law firm to take on large amounts of debt in anticipation
of expansion, while the firm's rainmakers are not obligated to stay and keep
their clients with the firm. 25 1 The exit of major partners can deprive a firm of
the revenues it had depended upon to pay the interest on debt, creating a
sudden and catastrophic collapse.252 A minimum level of disclosure would
help to prevent surprise collapses by warning employees about the amount
of leverage a firm has taken on. Employees would then be able to plan
for the amount of risk that the firm's finances presented, and minimize their
exposure to loss. Recent hires and prospective employees would not
waste time considering a firm that they believed to be "too risky" for their
personal tastes.
Additionally, disclosure would have numerous benefits for firms that are
253
not at risk. Disclosing firm finances would dispel rumors among employ-
ees that the situation is unstable, keeping partners and associates at the firm
by easing fears of financial stress.254 This would help to alleviate the difficul-
ties of a transient workforce twice over. Openness about the financial situa-
tion would show employees the reason for certain financial or compensation
decisions, eliminating any "us versus them" mentalities and facilitating coop-
erative solutions.255 Disclosure regarding firm hiring and promotion practice
accompanying firm financials could assist recruitment efforts by dispelling
worries of sexism at the firm, or eliminate sexism - intentional or not - by
shaming any firms with gender-disparate results.256 All in all, the majority of
a law firm's associates, potential associates, non-lawyer employees, and even
many partners should enjoy the benefits of knowing the true financial
situation of the firm.
lawyers ("The firm, based in New York, fell apart in a matter of weeks this year after
ousting its chairman and watching at least 250 of its 304 partners decamp to
competing firms.").
251. See Robert W. Hillman, Professional Partnerships, Competition, and the
Evolution of Firm Culture: The Case ofLaw Firms, 26 J. CORP. L. 1061, 1067 (2001)
(describing the ability of partners to move to new firms and take their clients with
them, creating financial instability at the abandoned firm).
252. Although a firm will be able to insist on payment of a share of client fees for
representation, which began at the firm, the exodus of partners will nonetheless de-
prive the firm of cash flows of future representation of that client. See id at 1069-74.
This share of fees for future representation will often be far more valuable than the
representation on the particular matter of representation when the partner departs. Id
253. See generally Studer, supra note 94, at 1.
254. Id. ("People assume the worst when they don't hear from leaders.").
255. Id.
256. See Grand, supra note 89, at 410-11 (describing how disclosure could reme-
dy gender discrimination in law firm hiring and promotions practices).
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2. Disclosure Would Benefit Clients and Prospective Clients
Consider the collapse of a law firm from the client's point of view. A
client has every incentive to avoid a firm teetering on the brink. The client
has selected a particular law firm for its competence in the field and invests a
significant amount of time and money in obtaining legal assistance. Upon
collapse, the partners and associates assigned to represent this client may
scatter to any number of different firms.257 If the client is lucky, one of the
departing partners keeps the file; otherwise, it is time to find new counsel. 25 8
The client could potentially end up paying to replicate large portions of the
representation, including basic review of the file. Worse, during a bankruptcy
regulators may wish to inspect a firm's documents, including files that may
be confidential and privileged. Hearings would be required to explain why
such documents are covered by attorney-client privilege, and this becomes
more complicated when counsel is no longer in the business.2 59 The client's
entire case could end up delayed as a result of the legal team representing it
being shattered.260 This is a nightmare for a client to face. A client would
therefore have every incentive to check firm finances and avoid firms that
present a substantial risk of collapse, unless it could obtain a discount on legal
fees proportionate to the risk. This risk premium would provide another in-
centive to law firms to avoid over leveraging.
3. Disclosure of Firm Finances Would Benefit Shareholders
and Creditors
The general public - including creditors and any potential share-
holders - could benefit from the disclosure of some amount of financial in-
257. See, e.g., Martin Coyle & Julie DiMauro, Dewey & LeBoeuf Collapse High-
lights Importance to Clients of Safeguarding Records, REUTERS (June 1, 2012),
http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2012/06/01/dewey- leboeuf-
collapse-highlights-importance-to-clients-of-safeguarding-records/ ("Records for
clients of attorneys moving to other firms would be transferred, as in the case of any
lateral transfer. The issue of records pertaining to clients not associated with any
departed attorneys is more problematic, because the firm has an obligation to notify
such clients and arrange for the proper disposition of the records.").
258. Id
259. See id ("[A] judge might need an explanation as to why a document was
covered by the privilege badge. A firm and its lawyer might need to explain this
in court.").
260. See Nate Raymond & Jessica Dye, Fallout from Dewey Collapse Hits Cli-
ents, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (May 28, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-05-
28/news/sns-rt-us-dewey-clientsbre84rOlc-20120528_1 clients-firm-winston-strawn
(describing a sixty-day reprieve granted to the Arab Bank Group, a defendant
represented by Dewey & LeBoeuf lawyers, because its defense team was "decimated"
by the bankruptcy).
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formation from large law firms. Currently, public perceptions and creditors'
views of firms are shaped by the limited information provided by law firms,
leading to an extreme emphasis on profits-per-partner rather than firm finance
as a whole.261 These metrics are easily manipulated by firms that seek to
bolster appearances simply by creating more "non-equity partners" and de-
creasing equity partners, or by cutting out low revenue or pro bono ser-
262
vices. Law firms focusing on these numbers have strong incentives to sac-
rifice long-term stability for short-term gains in purely money-driven metrics.
By contrast, a law firm providing a more detailed picture of its finances
would be less likely to be able to hide untoward details from the public be-
hind a favorable profit-per-partner number. Sunlight, as Louis Brandeis sug-
gested, would prove a powerful disinfectant for a law firm focusing too
strongly on bottom-line numbers. The general public, be they creditors, po-
tential shareholders, stakeholders, or clients, would all be able to form a more
accurate understanding of a firm's position in society if the firm were re-
quired to disclose financial information to the public.
4. Disclosure Is Compatible with Ethical and Legal Confidentiality
Requirements
Opponents of law firm incorporation have argued that the confidentiality
requirements of the attorney-client relationship are incompatible with the
mandatory disclosure required by the SEC and state securities laws.263 In
essence, the argument goes as follows: first, a lawyer has an obligation to
maintain the confidentiality of his clients' matters.264 Second, either a man-
datory disclosure regime - such as that required by securities laws - or a fi-
nancial disclosure system could require a firm to disclose when new clients
opt to retain its services but before the clients are ready to make a public an-
nouncement.265 One particularly acute example of this would be if a firm
specializing in mergers and acquisitions had been hired in confidence by a
large corporation to consider a possible acquisition. Such an event could be
considered material information required to be disclosed in a financial report,
but disclosure would run contrary to the client's justified need for discretion
261. See Petzold, supra note 56, at 89; MacEwen et al., supra note 51, at 72-73
(indicating profits per equity partner and revenue per lawyer receive the most empha-
sis and affect firm behavior the most of any metric).
262. See MacEwen et al., supra note 51, at 76.
263. See, e.g., Hodge, supra note 54, at 93; Steve Mark, Views from an Australian
Regulator, 2009 J. PROF. LAW. 45, 56-58 (2009).
264. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2012).
265. For example, if a firm retains a client with a substantial up-front fee shortly
before publishing its annual 10-K report or the mandatory reporting proposed herein,
skeptics argue that it would be required to disclose information regarding the source
of these funds in breach of client confidences.
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lest stock prices of its potential targets rise prematurely. However, this con-
cern for inconsistent obligations is overblown.
First, there may not actually be a contradiction between mandatory dis-
closure and client confidences. Generally speaking, the securities laws and
disclosure regimes only require reports on material information, and the U.S.
Supreme Court has defined this as information which would have a "substan-
tial likelihood" to be "viewed by the reasonable investor as having signifi-
cantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available." 266 It is reasona-
ble to wonder when the exact identity of a party might ever be capable of
significantly altering the total mix of information available to an investor.
Surely the only "material" information to an investor would be the amount of
money and the certainty of payment, without need for specific information
that could breach client confidences. Indeed, in crafting a new mandatory
disclosure regime states could carve out an exception stating that any infor-
mation that personally identifies a client would not be deemed material.267
Second, we can turn to the experience of Australia and its publicly-
traded law firms for guidance about how to handle potential conflicts. Slater
& Gordon are subject to reporting requirements, which include a continuous
disclosure requirement for information that could have a material effect on
stock valuation.268 The Australian authorities found a simple yet elegant
solution: simply require disclosure up-front in the prospectus and state that
the duties to the client would trump the duties to the shareholder in cases
of conflict.269 Placing shareholders on notice that the firm will not breach
client confidences should it face a contradiction like this serves to even
further remove the information regarding client identity from materiality
because shareholders will be able to discount their purchase price to account
for this risk.
Finally, the SEC already allows for requests for confidential treatment
of information that would otherwise be disclosed.27o These confidential
treatment requests are available for reasons that parallel the exemptions under
the Freedom of Information Act.271 The most pertinent of these exceptions
266. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
267. See Cobb, supra note 123, at 774-75 (suggesting, for example, that either a
regulatory carve-out for certain information or even confidentiality agreements for
nonlawyer managers could successfully keep confidential client information private).
268. See generally Steve Mark, supra note 263, at 56-58 (describing Australian
reporting requirements).
269. See id. at 58 ("the evident tension in duties may be resolved through careful
drafting of the corporation's prospectus, constituent documents and shareholder
agreements . . . ").
270. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 200.80, 230.406, 240.24b-2 (2013); SEC, Confidential
Treatment Requests, SEC.Gov (July 11, 2001), http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/
slbcfl r.htm.
271. 5 U.S.C.§ 552(b) (2012) (exempting from public disclosure matters covered
by statutes either without discretion or according to particular criteria).
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are for trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information,
and for information specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.272 Even
if confidential client information were otherwise subject to disclosure under
the securities laws or an expanded disclosure regime, a similar exemption for
confidential treatment of the most sensitive information should take prece-
dence over the needs for disclosure. All in all, there is no reason to suspect
that the obligation of confidentiality is actually in tension with reasonable
disclosure requirements in practice because of materiality limitations and
confidentiality exceptions.
5. Disclosure for All Firms of More Than 100 Lawyers
For the foregoing reasons, basic disclosure is essential for all firms of
more than 100 lawyers, regardless of whether these firms choose to incorpo-
rate. The disclosure for these firms does not need to be as extensive as the
disclosure for compliance with securities regulations; instead, this disclosure
regime could be modeled around the requirements for other professionals.
One example of this less extensive disclosure regime is the requirement of
broker-dealers to submit quarterly Financial and Operational Combined Uni-
form Single Reports, as required under Exchange Act Rule 17a-5 .273 This
report does not rise to the level of other SEC documents, such as registration
statements, but is nonetheless sufficient for a potential customer to infer the
financial solvency of the broker-dealer and to guard against some risky finan-
cial decision-making by the broker. This information should be required of
legal professionals for similar reasons it is required of brokers: because sun-
light is the best disinfectant for unsound financial practices.
The basic mandatory reporting required of law firms of more than 100
lawyers would not present any significant confidentiality concerns. The re-
porting would be restricted to a basic balance sheet and income statement,
omitting any client-specific details that could jeopardize confidentiality. The
required information would simply relate to solvency of the firm: assets, lia-
bilities, income, and expenses, broken down into constituent but not client-
specific categories. The disclosure of this information would permit current
and prospective employees and clients, as well as potential creditors, to judge
the financial solvency of the firm before making any decisions regarding rep-
resentation or investment. The result would likely be a more efficient market
for legal representation and employment by large law firms, and a cleansing
of debt-heavy balance sheets due to unfavorable market reaction to unsound
financial strategies.
272. Id. § 552(b)(3)-(4).
273. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (2013) (requiring the filing of audited
financial statements and the information required on related SEC forms, as well
as delivery to customers that request the information); SEC, FORM X-17A-5, supra
note 239.
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The legal profession has largely remained a self-regulating industry.
Other self-regulating industries have recognized the importance of financial
274disclosure to the maintenance of professional standards. By requiring the
legal profession to engage in the same disclosure that the legal profession
expects of others, we could raise the ethical standards of lawyers and ensure
the financial security of large law firms in the future. This would benefit
lawyers, their clients, and the law firms themselves moving forward.
VI. CONCLUSION
Introducing the corporate form to U.S. law firms is a step overdue. The
potential benefits of this structure - increased efficiency and innovation,
which would increase access to higher quality legal services - far outweigh
the speculative sacrifices to professional ethics. Increased transparency and
mandatory financial disclosure will end the practice of obscuring law firm
performance in misleading financial information. Clients deserve better, and
if U.S. firms want to remain competitive in the market for global legal ser-
vices they must have access to more flexible business structures. The notion
of the law firm as an entity distinct from a business is dying. Other countries
are recognizing that fact and are implementing changes that will disadvantage
U.S. firms. The writing was on the wall for bloated firms saddled with debt
when the 2008 recession hit. The time has come to change course and treat
law firms as the global enterprises they have become.
274. For example, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) acts as
the self-regulatory organization for securities firms and provides regulation and over-
sight to brokerages. Among other services, FINRA uses disclosure as a mechanism to
protect investors.
FINRA believes that investor education is a critical component of investor
protection. Over the last decade, we have worked hard to develop a strong in-
vestor education outreach program. We produce alerts, interactive tools and
educational content to help investors make wise financial decisions. Our Bro-
kerCheck tool, for example, provides investors with a quick way to check a
broker's disciplinary and professional background. Encouraging people to
take this simple step before doing business - or continuing to do business -
with a broker is part of our greater commitment to protecting investors.
Richard G. Ketchum, Chairman's Message, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/
AboutFINRA/ (last visited July 21, 2013).
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